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ABSTRACT
Although Massachusetts has steadily increased it's supply of
new affordable housing throughout the 80's, the overall supply
has dramatically declined during this same period. A rapidly
rising housing market has driven an increasing number of land-
lords to evict their low income tenants in order to convert their
units.
Steadily declining incomes among low income renters relative
to other income groups has heightened this instability by
widening the income gap between what landlords are charging and
what tenants can afford. When the resolution of this instability
enables both landlords and tenants to preserve joint tenure --
both stay where they are -- the conditions for preventing
homelessness and preserving affordable housing will be maximized.
Whereas many landlords are responding to a rising housing
market by operating to maximize profit only -- called "problem--
causing" landlords -- some landlords who have a "dual-purpose" --
to both provide affordable housing and make a return -- resist
the temptations of a rising housing market. What exists within
their relationship are both stabilizing forces -- which keep the
parties interdependent -- and room to negotiate -- which may be
widened or contracted by how landlords and tenants manage
themselves in response to the law, the courts, professionals, the
state and to each other.
Two professional organizations -- Greater Boston Legal
Services (GBLS) and a state Housing Services Program (HSP) whose
work is presented, differ as to their strategies for helping to
prevent homelessness and preserve affordable housing. Whereas
GBLS primarily defends tenants against eviction and deters
lawlessness on the landlord's part through legal and educational
means, HSP provides counseling, education, technical assistance
and mediation services to both landlords and low income tenants
to assist them both to remain in their existing housing.
As an effect of interventions by these professional organi-
zations, landlords and tenants may be likely to shift from dual-
purpose to problem-causing mode or vica versa in ways that both
impair and improve the conditions for preventing homelessness and
preserving affordable housing. When GBLS defends tenants against
problem-causing landlords, they may be likely to effect the land-
lord's shift into dual-purpose mode and to prevent homelessness.
However, if GBLS defends against dual-purpose landlords without
protecting these landlords' interests, they may be likely to
shift into problem-causing mode and out of the business of
providing affordable housing.
When HSP intervenes with landlords and tenants, on the other
hand, they are less able to effect shifts in modes. They are
less able to protect tenants from problem-causing landlords
however, and should not fully intervene unless this is possible.
HSP may instead help to widen the space for negotiation, if
possible, and to allow each party to extend further. HSP may
surface behavior issues of the tenant -- whose resolution may
rebuild the landlord's confidence to stay committed to joint
tenure.
HSP may go farther, furthermore, to "stabilize" tenants who
need help in order for them to remain in private housing.
Once agreements are achieved in which tenant's behavior must
change, thus, HSP should be both caseworker -- to help them begin
using 'self-help' services -- and probation officers -- setting
limits, goals and consequences -- to help tenants become stable
and break out of poverty and dependency cycles.
A new conception of a service system which these profes-
sionals may offer in conjunction with landlords and tenants is
thus proposed.
Proposed Service Delivery System for GBLS and HSP
dual-purp prob-causing
landlords landlords
dual-purp
tenants
prob-caus-
sinq tenants
Play HSP | Play HSP Play HSP
role Yes role role
should do
Yes conditional: Yes more moni-I
** toring
** HSP should be involved here only when they can balance the
power between landlords and tenants and can provide a non-coer-
cive atmosphere of negotiation. HSP must be able to protect
tenants if landlords try to manipulate the process to achieve
their interests only.
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PART I: FRAMING THE PROBLEM
CHAPTER 1: THE PROBLEM STATEMENT
"In the 1930's poverty was the unemployment line, it was a
nation down on it's luck. In the 60's and 70's it was the
crumbling ghetto, a separate place that a Great Society thought
it could reach out and repair. Now homelessness has crossed one
of those invisible lines of American politics. The homeless are
1
everywhere."
We see homelessness quite visibly in overfilled shelters and
in people sleeping in public buildings, abandoned cars, on the
streets or down alleys. More subtly, it appears when families
double up for the long haul or when single welfare mothers fall
behind on their rent to feed their children. In recent years,
the characteristics of the homeless have changed with young
married couples and their children entering the ranks alongside
the elders.
State officials claim they have never tackled anything so
complicated as the problem of homelessness. "The countervailing
forces, political whims, vulnerability to media blitzes, budget
issues, the basic psycho-social issues, etc. have created a very
complex constellation of problems," says Judy Reilly, Deputy
Assistant Commissioner for the Department of Social Services
(DSS). To resolve their root causes, Carol Johnson, Director of
Homelessness Services for the Department of Mental
1: New York Times article dated January 29th, 1989 entitled:
The Homeless at the Heart of Poverty and Policy: By Michael
Oreskes and Robin Toner
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Health (DMH), calls for the creation of "a department of family
life support that focusses on child development, personhood
education, parenting development etc." Having become the
poverty symbol of the 80's, homelessness has clearly refocussed
2
the debate about poverty throughout the country.
In Massachusetts, where I will be focussing my story,
3
a few key facts point to the causes of homelessness.
- Since 1970, the median rent in Boston has increased by
329%. Currently in only 8% of its private housing units is
the rent as low as $200/month which is the amount that a
family of three on AFDC (Aid to families with dependent
children) can afford.
- Since 1980, there has been an 18% increase in the number
of poor female-headed families in Massachusetts.
- Although the supply of subsidized family housing has
increased substantially (20%), the supply of affordable
units in 90% of the Commonwealth's total unsubsidized
housing stock has declined dramatically.
Although Massachusetts has significantly increased it's
supply of new affordable housing in the 80's, the overall supply
has steadily declined during the period. A combination of
rapidly rising rental rates and declining incomes among this low
income group relative to other income groups has caused this
increase in evictions.
Once these tenants are evicted, furthermore, they face very
2. The issue has engendered much support from the public. Poli-
ticians state that this growing awareness has provided a wedge
for them to win voter support for increased services that simply
talking to them about poverty does not).
3. These facts were presented by Dukakis in his FY '89 Comprehen-
sive Homeless Assistance Plan 2.
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limited opportunities to relocate; and, their vacated unit will
4
no longer remain affordable. Thus, preventing low income
tenants from being evicted is critical to preventing homeless-
ness. And, preventing landlords from selling their units will
also preserve the stock of affordable housing.
Although market factors and the law govern the 'external
affairs' between landlords and tenants, their 'internal affairs'
are governed by interactions within their relationship. These
include: offering and receiving help, making promises and commit-
ments; along with threatening, harrassing or otherwise gesturing
in ways which may escalate conflicts. It is this exchange of
interactions and actions taking place between landlords and
tenants that I will call the 'relationship between landlords and
tenants'. To make explicit how landlords and tenants relate, I
will examine their interactions as a 'culture' -- of values,
norms, beliefs and assumptions.
If their relationship begins to break down -- the income gap
grows too large, or other issues cause too great a divergence,
what the relationship will become is 'unstable'. The parties
will begin to undergo what Felstiner, Abel and Sarat call
5
the 'transformation of a dispute'. In this process, the
4. This is unlike situations in other parts of the US says Ed
Shanahan, managing director for the Rental Housing Association of
the Greater Boston Real Estate Board. Shanahan discusses the
effects of a 'soft' market in Texas where "[l]andlords advertise
6 months of free laundry service and 2 months of free rent to
lure people into their units."
5. Felstiner, William L.F., Abel, Richard L. and Sarat, Austin.
"The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming
and Claiming..."
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parties will move through problem definition toward some process
of dispute resolution to achieve an outcome. If both parties
stay where they are, they will preserve what I will call 'joint
tenure'. Otherwise, the parties will resolve their dispute
either by one party or both leaving. In this thesis, I will be
investigating how the way in which landlords and tenants manage
their relationship affects the conditions for preserving joint
tenure.
What landlords and tenants may 'be able to' or 'choose to'
be, in order to preserve joint tenure, is 'flexible'. Each here
is open to and interested in the other's situation, ready to
cooperate and willing to negotiate. When landlords and tenants
are 'flexible', they will 'extend themselves'. They will allow
for the time the other party needs in order to rehabilitate him
or herself within the relationship. Landlords will hold out
without collecting rent, the length governed by their confidence
of recouping some or all of it. Tenants, as well, will tolerate
minimally functioning bathrooms for some time, for example,
before calling on or citing the landlord to make repairs. I will
call what this is -- that 'adjusts' within their relationship --
their 'negotiating space', or 'negotiating room'. How landlords
and tenants manage themselves in response to the law, the courts,
professionals, the state, and each other serves either to 'widen'
or 'contract' this negotiating room.
A range of professional services has a significant impact on
both increasing and decreasing this negotiating space. I will
discuss and assess the approach of two organizations, each being
10
a central representative for a primary type. One is a program
within the Division of Neighborhoods and Economic Opportunity
under the Executive Office of Communities and Development (EOCD)
called the Housing Services Program, (HSP). The other is Greater
Boston Legal Services (GBLS).
The HSP's purpose is to "assist both low income tenants and
6
landlords to remain in their (private) housing stock" by provi-
ding the following services for both landlords and tenants:
one-to-one counseling, technical assistance, workshops and
mediation. The GBLS's purpose, on the other hand, is primarily to
"defend tenants against eviction and to deter lawlessness on the
7
landlord's part" by educating tenants and invoking the law.
GBLS provides free civil legal assistance to low-income people,
and offers a full range of advocacy options~ from advice to
litigation depending on the needs of the particular case.
Because the rising housing market has driven an increasing
number of landlords to upgrade their units themselves or to sell,
which has caused their rents to increase beyond the means of low
income tenants, the negotiating room between landlords and
tenants has steadily contracted throughout the 80's. Under
these circumstances, what has been widening, is what I will call
the 'income gap -- the difference between what landlords are
charging and what tenants can afford. When this income gap
becomes too wide, landlords will be driven to evict and will
6. EOCD Housing Services Program 1987 brochure
7. GBLS Housing Unit Plan: 1988
11
succeed unless the tenant can successfully invoke the law or
negotiate in order to prevent it. (Although there are various
other reasons why tenants might vacate these units -- fires,
arson, condemnation by the Board of Health, demolition etc. -- it
is primarily either in anticipation of eviction or by being
evicted that low-income tenants leave).
Certain landlords, though, resist these market temptations
because they are also committed to providing affordable housing.
One of these landlords told me, for example, that "every four
years or so a big bad condo converter makes a deal that's quite
difficult to turn down. I sit down with my accountant and then
decide I like the business enough and know I'm doing a service by
keeping low-income tenants in there, so I don't sell." I will
name these landlords -- who are committed to both providing
affordable housing and making a return -- 'dual-purpose' land-
lords.
These landlords, I will argue, will take on problem cha-
racteristics in response to tenants who they believe are dis-
respecting their needs and interests, either through their own
initiative or GBLS's. These landlords will shift into a mode I
will call: 'problem-becoming'. They cease being flexible because
tenants have stopped 'reciprocating' -- paying the rent or
arranging for repayment if they fall behind, preventing the
property from being damaged within reason, managing domestically
so as not to produce sanitation problems, and generally not
intruding on the landlord's 'decent enjoyment of the premises'.
I distinguish these 'dual-purpose' landlords from so-called
12
'problem-causing' landlords -- whose sole view of housing is as a
vehicle to maximize profit. 'Problem-causing' landlords, for
example, will acquire property specifically to turn it over most
rapidly for high profits. They are known to neglect maintenance
-- keeping bathrooms running, stopping rooves from leaking,
replacing appliances when they wear out. They are also known to
demand unreasonably high rent increases, sometimes to become
verbally and physically abusive, and altogether to make life
miserable for tenants. This includes: being absolutely infle-
xible in response to tenants' needs and proceeding to evict them
if necessary to best protect their interests only.
If HSP attempts to resolve disputes that involve problem-
causing landlords, even when the tenant is properly defended,
they may be unable to protect these tenants. Thus, HSP should
typically refer these cases to GBLS. Against these problem-cau-
sing landlords, I argue, we must protect their tenants, either by
-- defending them legally using GBLS, regulating them, or by
helping these tenants to acquire their properties when the
landlords sell -- in order to keep their rents affordable.
GBLS must also drive these problem-causing landlords away
from private eviction actions as much as possible into HSP-type
programs where professionals may help the parties balance the
power. When tenants have 3rd party assistance and are legally
informed within a professionally-managed negotiation arena, they
will likely to be more effective in protecting their tenancies
than when alone with their landlords, I believe. These problem-
causing landlords may begin here to behave like dual-purpose
13
landlords.
Just as there are 'problem-causing' landlords from whom we
must protect tenants, there also are 'problem-causing' tenants
from whom we must protect dual-purpose landlords. According to
Michael Stegman, investors call these tenants the ones "who
either intentionally or otherwise abuse the property, are not
regular rent payers, or disturb other tenants [or landlords] in
the structure." "According to landlords," Stegman tells us, "the
bulk of their serious problems are caused by only a few [of these
8
problem-causing] tenants." These tenants regularly resist any
social services assistance and refuse to comply with basic legal
obligations or demands placed on them by their landlords, inclu-
ding paying the rent.
In contrast to problem-causing tenants, however, 'dual-
purpose' tenants will make sure to protect their interests, but
will also attend to meeting the basic requirements of their
landlords as they are capable; and, they will use services
constructively to aid their doing so if necessary.
Just as dual-purpose landlords may 'shift' -- and turn into
'problem-becoming' landlords in response to 'problem-causing
tenant behavior, tenants may also 'shift' -- and turn into
'problem-DetComi ' mode -- often (but not necessarily) after
having been assisted by GBLS. For example, they will begin to
make legal threats or stop paying rent without just cause; or
they'll disrespect the other needs of the landlord. Although
GBLS undoubtedly may be proceeding in a legally ethical manner,
8. Stegman, Michael A.: Housing Investment in the I-nner City: The
Dynamics of Decline: A study of Baltimore, MD, 1968-1970 (162,3)
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the tenant's behavior may thus shift as a result into a legally
unethical mode. (I will define what this meansthroughout this
study through descriptions by landlords and professionals).
If dual-purpose tenants become mistreated by problem-causing
landlords, on the other hand, they should turn into problem-be-
coming mode. They should access legal assistance, organize, and
proceed in such a way that these landlordsdo not succeed at the
expense of these tenants.
When GBLS defends problem-causing tenants from being
evicted by dual-purpose landlords, I will argue, these tenants
may win temporarily by extending their tenancies a few months or
winning compensation. They will lose far more significantly,
however, by driving these landlords more strongly towards
eviction and causing their commitments to shift away from
providing affordable housing. When GBLS immediately frames their
role only as to defend tenants against eviction -- without
considering that these dual-purpose landlords may still want to
be 'flexible' and to preserve joint tenure upon conditions of
reciprocity -- they may be likely to cause this same shift to
occur.
For both these scenarios, I will argue, GBLS should play a
role similar to HSP -- to educate, help tenants define 'rea-
listic' short and long term options, and to help them achieve
agreements to which the landlord will commit. If GBLS does not
do some kind of screening in order to protect these dual-purpose
landlords from these tenants, I am arguing, we will lose not only
these landlords, but the larger dual-purpose landlord population
15
as well. This population will withdraw their commitment to
providing affordable housing or organize themselves to increase
their protections from GBLS and low-income tenants.
There is an important distinction to be made about the
problem-causing behavior of tenants who are in poverty. There
are 'problem-causing' tenants who on one end of a continuum are
'victims' and those on the other end who are 'perpetrators'.
Victims include tenants whose disadvantaged upbringings 'dis-
9
able' them from being able to function well in private housing.
Perpetrators include tenants who repeatedly damage their units
10
and threaten to sue landlords if they press charges.
These perpetrators really are victims who become perpetra-
tors because they have been quite victimized themselves in
earlier years. The sources of their victimization result from
being and having been -- of minority status, poor, ill-educated,
ill-nourished and ill-loved. For both these perpetrators and
victims, it is clear that we must improve our city and state
systems as well as society-at-large to help them break out of
their poverty and dependency cycles. We 'can and should do
more' to help them, until some point.
The strategies that professionals like Jeanne Gould use at
the Department of Public Welfare (DPW), which are called
9. Although I refer only to tenants here, there are 'victim'
landlords -- who skimp on maintenance or spend the tenant's
security deposit attempting to maintain affordable rates even
when to them doing this is unaffordable.
10. There also are 'perpetrator' landlords -- who disrespect the
need for tenants to have the basics in their unit, and raise the
rent at an unreasonably high rate. Tenants,thoughare more prone
to show these victim ---- perpetrator characteristics because of
having been impoverished, which inclines individuals to be
polarized such as this.
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'stabilization' services, I will argue, is 'doing more as we
should'. Gould's work extends 'helping' about as far as the
state can go.
To help tenants who have just previously been homeless to
become and to remain stable in their new housing, Jeanne 'con-
tracts' with them. What she provides on her end is case manage-
ment -- counseling clients to hook them into services. What the
tenants must do in response is to enter into and to uphold
agreements that 'obligate' (and encourage) them to increase their
participation with self-help services among other self-improve-
ment activities. Jeanne will also provide probationary services
-- setting goals, limits and consequences -- to help clients
become more responsive to helping themselves. This is all
designed to maximize the incentives for tenants to break out of
their poverty and dependency cycles. Much of this approach to
stabilizing tenants, I will argue, HSP can adopt for working with
those in the "at-risk" category to prevent them from becoming
homeless.
However, if perpetrators continue to operate 'as is' despite
whatever stabilization services and resources are offerred, we
must establish conditions on which services may be continued.
The state should make extensions of their benefits conditional on
participation in self-help trainings to provide 'carrots' -- to
entice them to take part. A HSP worker may play a role here as a
'broker' between tenants and the state -- to advocate for the
tenant to receive continued services on the basis of the tenant
meeting the HSP's expectations for progressing in self-help
17
development.
The following matrix shows when and how I believe that HSP
and GBLS should be involved.
Proposed Service Delivery System for GBLS and ESP
Greater Boston
Legal Services
Housing Services
Program
dual-purp,
landlords
prob-causing dual-purp.
landlords tenants
prob-caus-
ingr tenants
Play HSP play HSP play HSP|
role Yes role role
'should do:
Yes Conditional Yes more mo-
** initoring |
What I propose is a new conception of a service system which
these professionals may offer in conjunction with landlords and
tenants.
** HSP should be involved here only when they can balance the
power between landlords and tenants and can provide a non-coer-
cive atmosphere of negotiation. HSP must be able to protect
tenants if landlords try to manipulate the process to achieve
their interests only.
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CHAPTER 2: ON WHICH TYPE OF LANDLORD WILL I BE FOCUSSING?
By being motivated to make a profit, landlords have been
able to provide housing for low income tenants. As one landlord
stated it, "As the landlord develops something for desire of
profit, he is also creating good things along the way." "If we
hadn't been entitled to profits [for our efforts], we wouldn't
have been able to stay in the affordable housing business," said
another.
Many landlords, though, are not committed to providing
affordable housing. The Mayor of New York City, Robert Wagner,
once stated that the inner city housing problem was caused by the
"slumlord, that small body of landlords who are out to squeeze
every last dollar out of their property as quickly as they can,
regardless of the consequences in terms of human lives, suffering
and sickness." We hear reports about these types of landlords
daily. To control them, we must invoke the law to defend
tenants, and restrict to some degree their abilities to convert
affordable housing into housing at high rental rates.
I present the following typology, suggested to me by Jean
Charn, Director of Jamaica Plain Legal Services, of landlords
that she has found in her work currently.
19
TYPOLOGY OF LANDLORDS
Developer/Converter Type
- Can be large or small |
I |I
- Purpose is to buy at low
price, to convert to luxury,
condo or coop as quickly as
possible and then to sell at
high price
- Puts very little money
into maintenance
- Often does a lot of work
by themselves
-Occupies a growing share
of the housing market
Old-time Slumlord
-Minimizes maintenance
expenses
-Avoids legal requirements
-Reaches limit of 'milking'
the unit and then abandons it'
to the city
-Very few still around
because market doesn't allow
it. (City will catch up with'
them too quickly) .
Longterm Residential mixed
income landlords
- Oriented to long term
appreciation, not short
| term gain
Maintains and services unit:
-Uses 707/Section 8 voucher:
- ability to provide affor-
dable housing will decreas
if state funding drops off
- Divided among two groups:
* Those who are looking to
let go of low-income end o:
business, direction is to
provide more luxury units
* Those who are motivated
'to keep mixed income variety
'of housing
-. 1
-I
lOwner-Occupier or 'small'
'landlords (owning < 5 units)
'-Owns one or a few properties
only
- Buys property to meet own
'housing expenses, expects to
pay mortgages with rental
'income
- Divided among two groups:
* those looking to buy
'their next home who want to
'profit by raising the rent
land converting the unit.
* those who don't keep up
'with market rental rates, and'
'are looking mostly to cover
'costs, interested in tenant
'relationships and in
I preserving affordable housing'
20
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I
Landlords do not stay static in each category. They shift
across them depending on the market and their motivations. High
profits available from condo conversions throughout the 80's, for
example, caused many landlords to switch out of affordable
housing. GBLS's success has been in defending these tenants by
fighting in court or by forcing landlords to negotiate with their
tenants.
Although the rising housing market has accelerated this
shift away from affordable housing, GBLS has stopped some of
these landlords from succeeding and deterred others from trying.
In this thesis, I will be focussing on those 'dual-purpose'
landlords within the owner-occupier and long term residential
categories who are committed both to making a return and to
providing affordable housing. Within the longterm residential
category, furthermore, I will also limit my focus to those who
own and/or manage 75 units or less. By owning less than 75
units, generally, landlords are able to manage their businesses
-- collect monies, lease the units, resolve problems and conduct
personal relations with the tenants -- themselves.
Is it possible for a dual-purpose landlord to survive?
Chapter 707 and Section 8 certificates and other government
supports have helped by guaranteeing for some landlords a sizable
proportion of their income. In a wider sense, Roger Krohn tells
11
us, a "local-amateur" economy exists in most cities, whose
landlords are not motivated solely by high returns. These
11. Krohn, Roger G., Fleming, Berkeley, and Manzer, Marilyn. The
Other Economy: The Internal Logic of Local Rental-Housing
Toronto, Canada: Peter Martin Associates Limited. 1977
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landlords "minimize external financing, manage and maintain
buildings themselves and avoid cash expenditures in several other
ways," says Krohn. Long time owners often also carry small if
any mortgages and can thus transfer their low overheads into low
rental rates.
Many also provide affordable housing, Krohn argues, because
of the value they place on their relationships with their
tenants. Building these relationships can provide multiple
benefits, Krohn tells us, including "personal work satisfaction,
kin solidarity [with their tenants], friendship, better housing,
a secure social place, and in some cases, a higher income."
George Sternlieb, who also studied the composition of landlords,
found among the owners of tenements in Newark and New York City
"housewives, craftsmen, businessmen, and retirees, in addition to
12
full-time real estate professionals" who would likely seek
benefits through their relationships with tenants. There is much
evidence that this type of landlord also exists throughout the
metropolitan Boston area.
Why focus on these 'dual-purpose' landlords?
Within this typology, I have identified two types of
landlords -- dual-purpose and problem-causing landlords -- each
of which require different types of interventions in order to
protect joint tenure. Against those problem-causing landlords
who operate legally but strictly to maximize profit, it is quite
difficult to protect their tenants without the help of non-pro-
12. Sternlieb, George. The Tenement Landlord. New-Brunswick.
Urban Studies, Rutgers, The State University.
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fits or regulations like rent control on top of the role of GBLS.
Against those problem-causing landlords who also neglect basic
responsibilities like maintenance and who proceed illegally to
14
evict, the role of GBLS may be sufficient.
By focussing on dual-purpose landlords, I do not mean to
imply that we need not increase our efforts against problem-cau-
sing landlords. Because researchers have focussed much more, I
believe, on how to deter the problem-causing landlord's progress,
I will focus instead on how best to allow dual-purpose landlords
to succeed. I also believe that discovering better strategies
for protecting their interests will provide some missing links
for understanding how better to preserve joint tenure. There are
four primary reasons why we should understand better how dual-
purpose landlords operate and how best to protect their interests
in order to prevent homelessness and preserve affordable housing.
1) They control a reasonable proportion of the housing
stock in the Metropolitan Boston area.
Jack Hall, a manager of Boston's Rent Equity Board who deals
daily with landlords, presented a rough picture of how many
13. Non-profits may either advocate, to keep the issue of the
negative practices of the landlords in the public eye, or they
may help tenants to form cooperatives to buy out the landlord
when he sells. They may then sell again if they need to, but be
able no matter what to remain in their units at affordable rates.
14. GBLS's success here depends on how the courts will operate.
Assuming the landlords' violations are 'significant enough' and
the judge is considering both parties equally on their legal
merits, likely GBLS will be able to successfully defend these
tenants.
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dual purpose landlords own what proportion of units in Boston.
Hall first says that: (Figures are approximate)
1. 5000 landlords control 75,000 units in the city of Boston.
2. Of these 5000 landlords, 800 control 50,000 of these 75,000
units.
3. The remaining 5000 landlords control the remaining 25,000
units.
Thus, 800 'large' landlords (or 14% of all registered),
average 62.5 units each and control two-thirds of all registered
units. 5000 'small' landlords, (86% of all registered), average
5 units each and control one-third of all registered units.
Hall then says that "so many landlords have not registered
their properties that he doesn't want to know about it" --
meaning that the proportion of unregistered-to-registered
landlords is quite high. He also says that the larger the land-
lord, the more likely that he'll be registered. Ed Shanahan,
Managing Director of the Rental Housing Association of Greater
Boston Real Estate Board, confirms this, as he states: "If your
business is greater than 75 units, quite likely you'll be
registered recognizing the legal risks and consequences of not
doing so." Among these unregistered units, thus, the 'small'
landlords control a much greater proportion than that which they
control among the registered units. I estimate that this raises
the proportion of units small landlords control from one-third to
one-half, or 50%.
Distinguishing what proportion 'within' this proportion are
dual-purpose is quite difficult to do because these landlords
shift across categories. Because the market has been so strong
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in recent years (until 1988), many more small landlords have
shifted to 'profit-only' than is typical. When these landlords
now assume expensive mortgages having bought at inflated prices,
they can no longer be able to maintain affordable rental rates.
I estimate that this brings the proportion of control small
dual-purpose landlords have over the city's housing stock from
one-half down to one-quarter, or 25%.
I include longterm residential landlords, (who are small
enough to be able to manage their own properties = less than 75
units), in my subgroup. They are typically more stable in
response to market swings and understand better how to use the
law, yet are still prone to the pressures to gentrify. When
combined with the dual-purpose small landlords. I estimate they
bring this one-quarter figure back up to one-third. I conclude
that about one-half of the housing stock is controlled by these
dual-purpose landlords.
2) If these dual-purpose landlords sell, however, we may
lose a significant amount of affordable housing.
First, we lose landlords who are committed to providing
affordable housing. As one landlord stated, "I recognize that
these tenants are having a hard time, and I do whatever I can to
help them." These are the landlords who, as one told me, "feel
discouraged because tenants do have legitimate problems and
deserve to have affordable housing."
Second, it's likely if that unit is sold that it will not
remain affordable. Keeping these landlords in business safe-
guards us to some degree against gentrification. As one landlord
put it, "If I do sell, there goes good housing stock for low-in-
25
come people." Developers will be likely to buy up these units
and will then charge rents that are unaffordable to low-income
tenants.
3) The small landlords are at greatest risk of not protec-
ting their interests when tenants defend themselves
Small landlords are most likely to be the least well-orga-
nized among all types to protect themselves from well-defended
15
tenants. Rather than to first make sure they are well-defended
legally after which they may make concessions and negotiate
knowing that their defenses are in place, they instead private
tell their tenants to go, hoping not to have to proceed legally.
If tenants explore and then act on their legal options, they may
be likely to get the case dismissed and also possibly win
16
financial compensation.
Landlords will typically respond by becoming even more
inflexible and adversarial, and then often make further illegal
moves which may compound the problem until they figure out how to
use the law. What allows landlords and tenants to be flexible
is when they are well-defended legally such that they can make
15. Many say it's the landlord's own fault that they don't know
how to use the law, but small landlords counter by highlighting
the difficulties of doing this. An example Hall gives of the
difficulties small landlords face in keeping up with the law is
that the rent control regulations have been amended so many times
the past four to five years that even the rent board staff can't
keep up with them. This argument can be extended to non-regu-
lated situations.
16. This often works in the converse -- in which the tenant is
afraid of the landlord and simply leaves when told to keep the
conflict from escalating.
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concessions knowing they can invoke the law if necessary.
The longterm residential dual-purpose landlords, in con-
trast, are typically much better educated about how to use the
law to preserve joint tenure. These landlords typically have
discovered workable strategies to be able to balance invoking the
law and being flexible.
4) Small landlords are less financially stable than the
larger ones
These are the landlords who sometimes wish they were able to
carry' a rent-delinquent tenant because they value the relation-
ship but are less flexible because they need tenants' rents to
pay their mortgages. Although the larger landlords can more
easily afford to evict tenants, they also don't depend as much on
each tenant's monthly rent and may more easily arrange to 'carry'
tenants based on their agreement to repay. Understanding how
small landlords currently manage this bind and what more can be
done will also help resolve the overall problem.
In sum, small, dual-purpose landlords are generally less
sophisticated in using the law and less financially stable, yet
they provide a significant proportion of affordable housing
especially when combined with the dual-purpose longterm resi-
dential landlords. The associate director of Massachusetts
Tenants Organization, Michael Fogelberg, agrees that when the
market is an obstacle to the success of small landlords, the
17. It's important to note that a landlords' or tenants' aware-
ness of legal rights does not necessarily mean they will not
employ them as a first resort.
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state should provide more resources to help them protect their
businesses. I agree with this yet I argue that we have to do
more. We must understand how their 'relationships' with tenants
affect their abilitgito stay in business and what more might be
done to protect them in ways that also prevent tenants from being
evicted. Understanding these effects and identifying solutions
will help us improve our ability to preserve joint tenure.
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PART II
PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH RESULTS
CHAPTER 3: SETTING THE STAGE
A. Introduction
In this thesis, I have conducted a qualitative exploration
into the culture within which landlords and low-income tenants
interact and the role that professionals play. I have both
pursued an anthropological investigation of how the issues of
instability and eviction are addressed, and have also formulated
an argument about how HSP and GBLS could improve their service
delivery to better serve the goals of preventing homelessness and
preserving affordable housing.
I have interviewed a number of landlords and tenants,
professionals who work in the public, private and non-profit
sectors, city and state officials and others to do this research.
I engaged these people quite candidly on the issues of how land-
lords and tenants manage their relationships, how professionals
interacted, what factors disrupted joint tenure and how they
resolved their disputes, especially about the issue of eviction.
Because I was interested to know how landlords and tenants faced
these issues, I interviewed ones who had just faced instability
within their relationships that escalated to encompass the issue
of eviction.
As I began this research, I set out to understand better how
landlords and tenants managed a generic tension -- between what
they thought 'should' happen, and what 'ended up' happening
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because of their 'circumstances' -- including the influence of
professionals. Unable to pay the rent (or other expenses), how
if at all might a tenant factor in the landlords' 'fair claims'
to it, for example? And given the difficult financial and
accompanying psychological crises typically facing tenants who've
become rent-delinquent, how might a landlord weigh this against
his other business considerations.
What became immediately apparent, as I listened, was that
within the relationship between landlords and tenants lay a
culture -- of norms, beliefs, values, philosophies, and rules --
expressed through specific language and terms, and regular
behaviors. As part of this culture, landlords and tenants
negotiated in order for each to meet their needs and interests.
Interviewing people dealing with eviction surfaced this culture
more clearly, I believe, than if I had selected landlords and
tenants in another way. By having addressed this issue,
furthermore I believe, landlords and tenants discovered whatever
creativities and flexibilities they do bring to the relationship
and the role the relationship itself plays in preserving joint
tenure.
How each responded when I first asked them to discuss what
'did' happen, what 'should' happen and why the difference (if
any), -- was quite different. Landlords discussed the satis-
factions of providing affordable housing. They also discussed
their need to receive rent and to not be disrupted by tenants'
lifestyles. When these weren't met, landlords discussed norms --
how should government respond, what should tenants-do, and what
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should the landlords responsibility be towards them.
What tenants emphasized more were their 'circumstances' --
being unable to get daycare or a welfare check, utilities being
shut off, no food in the kitchen. Their feelings came through
clearly -- feeling harrassed and confused, afraid of their
landlords, worried about the kids, upset with themselves. They
talked less about 'fairness' or what 'ought' to happen, to
landlords let alone to themselves, I believe, because of their
circumstances.
Hearing landlords and tenants discuss their situations, I
began to posit that the way they managed their relationship
affected quite significantly their ability to negotiate -- in
ways in which both parties became satisfied. Not only did the
market or government funding influence this ability, but issues
such as -- accountability to agreements, honesty and upfrontness,
respect for the other party -- as well played a role. The result
was that the central focus of my research began to revolve around
what 'the relationship between landlords and tenants had to do
with preserving joint tenure.
B. The Limitations of my Research
There are a few key limitations to the research I conducted.
1. Because I limited my research only to those parties who
received professional services and hence did not reach that group
of landlords and tenants who resolved their disputes privately, I
have missed studying an important group for understanding how
landlords and tenants manage the issue of eviction. In this
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group, which many believe is much larger than that which does
access services, landlords and tenants will be much more likely
to treat each other worse and thus illustrate the kind of
behavior which professionals must learn how to respond more
effectively to. To do this research requires much more time
spent within neighorhoods playing an anthropological and a
detective role to build an empirical picture of how indigenous
patterns of dispute resolution occur.
2. Because of my time constraints, I was able to elicit the
stories of only those for whom it took minimal effort to be able
to do so. Hence, I was not able to talk but for a few minutes
with landlords and tenants who I have labelled as 'problem-cau-
sing'. By hearing only through secondhand sources how these
problem tenants and landlords behaved, I fell prey, no matter how
'neutrally' I phrased my questions, to receiving more of a
biassed report about them and hence of their "own voices"
(Gilligan, 1982) than I wished.
To have been able to have talked with them, I believe, I
would have needed to have taken much more time (and possibly
needed more skill) to carefully build rapport with them so they
could trust me, afterwhich they might then begin to tell their
stories. I also believe that problem-causing landlords and
tenants are least likely, naturally, to be willing to discuss how
they operate because their practises sometimes breach ethical
standards. I faced an additional bind with the tenants because
many of them had been evicted and were unreachable by telephone
or letter.
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3. I talked only with those landlords and tenants whose
relationship had recently undergone a threat to the tenure of one
or both parties. I am limited, thus, in being able to speak
about how landlords and tenants 'typically' interact.
4. I did not do any cross-comparison. Due to time con-
straints, I was not able to interview tenants and landlords who
used GBLS and HSP in other regions in order to compare and test
my results.
Thus, I was not able to learn about the "worst" cases on
which many believe we must focus the most attention in order to
best prevent homelessness and preserve affordable housing. I was
also unable to have any substantial conversations with those
problem-causing landlords and tenants whose behavior most
threatens joint tenure and about whom professionals need to learn
a lot more in order to resolve these housing issues. I did not
talk with those landlords and tenants who were not facing threats
to their tenure and thus don't have a base from which to under-
stand how 'differently' they behave when they do face threats.
And, I didn't compare my results across regions to test how much
the characteristics of that region -- it's economics, politics,
population demographics, etc. -- may have biassed my results.
What I was able to learn was that the underlying culture of
landlords and tenants was consistent across my characters as
illustrated by a number of themes that emerged. I believe,
furthermore, that the population I did interview was more aware
of when they would be flexible and how else they could extend
themselves to the other because they had just undergone a threat
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to their stability. What the characteristics of my sample have
provided, I believe, is a highly appropriate population for a
story about preventing homelessness and it's threats.
C. The Cast of Characters
The Landlords (The names of these landlords have been
changed to protect confidentiality).
1. James Boulder: A longterm residential landlord who has
been in business for over 30 years, James has managed
anywhere from 70-200 mixed income units over his career, a
portion of which he's owned. He had just completed an
eviction process in which his tenant eventually left on
court day.
2. John Swimmer: Owning about 30 units each renting at
$650/month, Johns' rents are affordable enough that 60% of
his calls come from Chap. 707/ Section 8 tenants. John has
been in business for over 15 years. He had just won a
judgement against a tenant who was represented by GBLS.
Total cost was: $2500 unpaid rent, $1000 legal fees, $1800
code violation = $5300 altogether.
3. Len Simon: Works as administrator for low-income public
housing projects statewide. Has two daughters, owns two
units, did all the improvements himself. Had just negoti-
ated with GBLS attorney for tenant (Jini Fisher) to move out
after five month process including two court appearances and
failed mediation effort. Total costs were: $2500 in rent,
$800 in code violations, $6000 in renovations and an
additional 125 person-hours to repair damage.
4. Ellen and Bill Heckler; Ellen works as a bank tender and
Bill as a high school driving teacher. They have one child.
They own two properties and have rented mostly to section 8
tenants. They had just won an eviction case on nuisance
grounds -- excessive disturbances through parties and
fights -- where GBLS represented the tenant. The tenant was
arrested twice while on the property. Total costs: $1600
unpaid rent + legal fees.
5. Frank Kessler: Works as a middle manager in a computer
firm. Owns one rental property. After tenants had fallen
a few months behind in rent for second time, Frank used
Tri-CAP mediation services to resolve his issues. The
tenant remained.
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6. Daniel O'Shay; Owns two buildings one of which he rent.
Married with two kids. Works as an architect. Attempted
to resolve nonpayment case Laurie Miller through mediation
but ended up evicting through court action.
7. Pam Brimmer; mother is Cecilia Billona who's owned two
rental units for about 20 years. Pam recently took
over the landlord management because of her mother's ill
health. Just completed 10 month eviction process where
tenant received GBLS representation. Spent $10,000 in
unpaid rent, $5000 as settlement for moving, and
$1000's to repair damage plus over $5000 in legal fees.
8. Renee Coles: Has owned two units until recently. Sold
one, and will now sell the other. Renee has used Tri-CAP's
mediation and counseling services for a number of tenants.
9. Sam Plione: A first generation immigrant was Italy, Sam
works as a small business accountant and has two kids. He
has owned a 30 unit single room occupancy property until
recently. Sam has used Tri-CAP's services on a number of
occasions.
The Tenants:
(The names of these tenants have been changed to protect
confidentiality).
1. Joan Bennis; Single mother of one; Section 8 tenant
living in EOCD-funded private housing property. Received
GBLS assistance to successfully prevent landlord from suing
her for nonpayment of rent increase (which was illegal
according to EOCD regulations).
2. Jini Fisher; Mother of two kids. Husband had recently
left her; he had begun to use drugs and abuse her. (Had
just gotten restraining order against him). Husband
fought to avoid paying child support; Began missing rent
payments, and eventually faced eviction charges; after first
court hearing received GBLS assistance and tried mediation:
eventually resolved case in court to move out.
3. Mike and Martha Fisk; Mike works intermittently as an
apprentice plumber at $7/hr, has two kids' Martha works
part-time. Was in rent arrears off and on for 10 months;
Received Emergency assistance first time fell behind in
rent; second time reached repayment agreement through
mediation.
35
4. Mimi Berman; Early 20's; single mother on AFDC (claims
couldn't afford to work because of daycare expenses); Was
evicted on no-fault grounds (landlord moved his close
relative into the unit); Proceeded in court to 'buy time',
and planned to move into sisters temporarily; hoping to get
707 housing but had no other housing options.
5. Sheila Payson: Tenant with two kids; Had been temporarily
laid off and fell behind in the rent. Went through medi-
ation to resolve the rent and other issues.
Professionals: The following is a list of the primary
professionals from whom I drew my research results.
1. Josh Jacks: A mediator now for over 8 years, Josh has
worked for a number of community-based and court-based
mediation programs and is also the Assistant Director for
the Graduate Certificate Program in Dispute Resolution at
UMASS Boston. Josh has been a mediator for Tri-CAP (Commu-
nity Action Program) for two years.
2. Carol Burner: Carol is Tri-CAP's landlord counselor.
Carol has been doing community-based social services work
for many years. Had most recently been working as a housing
advocate until coming to Tri-CAP.
3. Helena Chaikins: Helena has been on Tri-CAP's HSP staff
for 2 1/2 years as a tenant counselor and in an admini-
strator for the overall low income advocacy department.
Helena also works with a number of broad based coalitional
efforts working on anti-poverty-related issues.
4. Jane Reikard: Jane has worked in the landlord/tenant
dispute resolution field for over 12 years. Jane is the
director of the city of Quincy's Rent Grievance Board.
5. Nancy Callanan; Nancy is the Director of the Housing
Services Program for Quincy Community Action Program.
6. Dick Bauer: Dick is an attorney who works for Greater
Boston Legal Services based in Quincy. Dick received a
Master of City Planning Degree in the Department of Urban
Studies and Planning at MIT.
7. Wyn Gerhard; An attorney who works with Greater Boston
Elder Services (A division within Greater Boston Legal
Services)
8. Jay Rose: Staff attorney for GBLS
9. Jack Hall; Jack works as a manager for the City of
Boston's Rent Equity Board.
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10. Linda Garcia; Linda works as a paralegal for GBLS
11. Ed Shanahan; Ed is the Managing Director for the
Rental Housing Association, a division of the Greater Boston
Real Estate Board.
Code List for State and local agencies which I will be mentioning
1. DSS: Department of Social Services
2. DMH: Department of Mental Health
3. EOCD: Executive Office of Communities and Development
4. DPW: Department of Public Welfare
5. EOHS: Executive Office of Human Services
6. CAP: Community Action Program
D. Discussion of the Characters
i. Who are the landlords?
The stories dual-purpose landlords tell about how they
became property owners reveals much about their motivations as
small business people. They also provide important information
about the nature of their relationships with tenants.
Most invested in their property hoping to help pay their
housing costs, build their equity and generate a little income on
the side, if possible. They all acknowledged doing as much of
the maintenance work as possible out of financial necessity.
Many mentioned how far they had stretched themselves financially
to be able to become owners.
- Cecilia Billona eventually bought property for those
reasons. As her daughter told me, "I lived in those apartments
when I grew up and my Mom and Pop worked 18 hours a day to be
able to buy them."
- The Hecklers bought "as an investment for the future not
thinking about immediate profit." And after not receiving rent
for some months they told me. "We don't have much money and
really depend on the rent for the mortgage. We could easily have
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charged more rent for this housing..... we're not out to gouge
anyone."
- Working full time with HUD managing low income public
housing projects, Len Simons invested so that his daughters could
live in them, not focussing his efforts, he said, on maximizing
income.
For the 'longterm residential' owners, their entries into
the business were unplanned at best. John Boulder's story was
typical.
- First, he bought into the paint store he had helped run
for some time for his uncle. Then, as he reported "I began
meeting real estate people. We weren't doing well in the paint
business, but people wanted house contracting work which I began
doing. Doing renovations for people who had bought their own
homes, I decided I could buy also, so I slowly began acquiring
old houses to fix up and sell. Gradually I traded up, and after
15 years dropped the contracting to be full time in property
management." Boulder "plodded slowly," he told me, doing all the
work himself for over 20 years before he began hiring people.
Others also mentioned how unplanned their entries into the real
estate business were.
Some mentioned their pride and commitment to be providing
affordable housing. John Swimmer told me: "It's [his pro-
perty's] like a new car. I wash it, take pride in it. I like
puttering on it." Another told me: "I get a certain satis-
faction from turning a 13 unit low-income SRO [single room
occupancy] into a 30 units. I like seeing the building there and
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thinking that these tenants have affordable rents." And another
expressed his satisfaction in being able to offer low income
rents "in a time when not many are available." This satis-
faction seemed to be increased by their personal relationships
with tenants.
ii. Who are the tenants
The tenants about whom I'm talking are low-income. I define
low-income here as less then 50% of median income. Most of those
who I interviewed qualified for GBLS assistance. (A family of
four who is earning less than $1200/month (approximately)
qualifies and an individual who is earning4than $600/month also
qualifies).
Many work in wage labor jobs, others are on welfare. All
share the common experience of having limited income to allocate
in a region in which the cost of living is one of the highest in
the nation.
These are the people who occupy the lower rungs of the
socio-economic ladder. They include those on welfare as well as
the working poor. Many are of minority status, lack education
and job skills, and daily face discrimination and difficult
choices about rationing scarce resources of food, money and
patience to tend to the needs of their children. The rent
problems they face are typically just the edge of a plate full
with problems, namely; family break-ups, health problems,
substance abuse and others. Characterized as "at risk" of
becoming homeless, this tenant population is marginal enough that
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temporary disruptions in their health, jobs or family life easily
escalate to critical proportions.
On one end of a continuum of how these tenants manage
themselves in private housing are those who are known as
"problem [causing] tenants." Langley Keyes, a professor of urban
studies and planning in DUSP, defines problem tenants as those
individuals who "consistently terrorize, antagonize, or
18
violate the rights of other residents living nearby." Michael
Stegman defines a problem family as "one who either intentionally
or otherwise abuses the property, is not a regular rent
19
payer, or disturbs other tenants in the structure."
Objectively speaking, Pam Brinners' and Ellen Hecklers'
20
tenants were problems-causers. An example Pam provided for me
about their behavior is that "these tenants swore at my mother
regularly and had threatened to kill another woman who her
daughter approached to pick a fight with." Her tenant was cited
for assault as was the tenant's daughter a number of times.
Ellen's tenant's child was removed by 51A petition; the mother
was arrested twice as were some of her friends on the property
for drinking and abusive behavior. She was evicted on nuisance
charges.
18. Keyes, Langley. "Problem People in Public Housing."
Unpublished Draft
19. Stegman, Michael. Housing Investment in the Inner City
Cambridge, MA. MIT Press, 1972. Pg. 163
20. Just who is a "problem [causing] tenant?" If we defined
problem tenants by who they are identified by -- class, ethnic or
racial group or degree of social service support -- each might
lose the chance to 'be judged individually'. And if we could
define them by personal actions like anti-social behavior,
destructiveness towards property and criminal activity, this
still leaves much room for interpretation. Deciding who is a
"problem tenant" raises difficult issues.
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LANDLORDS AND
TENANTS
A. The Distribution of Power within the Landlord/tenant
Relationship
Along with the market and government, I have argued that
'the relationship between landlords and tenants' also signifi-
cantly affects the ability of landlords and tenants to maintain
joint tenure. There has been a great deal of discussion and
controversy, however, about how power is distributed within this
relationship. Because this issue is so central, I will discuss
it throughout this thesis and will only introduce it here.
It is commonly agreed that the law was written to give
landlords power over tenants. As a result, the tenant's legal
obligation to pay rent was independent of the landlord's legal
21
obligation to maintain the property in a habitable condition.
Without this legal right to decent quarters, tenants could not
obligate landlords to maintain the basics like the bathroom or
heating system; furthermore, they feared that landlords would
evict them if they pushed landlords to maintain these.
Although the nature of this relationship has been unequal,
the balance of power has become more equalized in recent years.
As Wyn Gerhard, a GBLS attorney stated, "the laws now provide for
a lot of tenant rights... as in a requirement, a contract that
the landlord provide decent housing in exchange for the rent."
Although tenants are now much better protected under law,
many maintain quite strongly that tenants still occupy a very
21. As extracted from rules developed in Medieval England that
formed English Common law governing leases.
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unequal position, much reflected by their fear to assert them-
selves. "They're afraid to go to court... they want to take the
path of least resistance, to pay the rent increase to avoid any
hassles... they just have some real inhibitions," a GLBS attorney
told me. One tenant confirmed this, telling me: "If I had gone
to court I think he [the landlord] would have made things
uncomfortable [for me]. It's his place not mine." Many believe,
as a result, that landlords will neglect maintenance and evict
without thinking they will have to follow due process.
Many landlords with whom I spoke, on the other hand, are
afraid that they can't protect themselves from tenants. "My
tenant could have gone in and destroyed the property and proven I
was illegal and I don't think I would have been able to defend
myself," one landlord told me. In Len Simon's case, for example,
the tenant kicked in five doors, damaged the kitchen floor,
knocked holes in the walls and soiled a brand new rug costing him
many $1000's -- without1hbeing able to collect on any of this --
which indicates how serious this issue is to landlords.
Landlords also feared that they couldn't protect themselves
from code violations. "If tenants went to the building inspec-
tion department to cite them, they would very likely be able to
cite any landlord who's owned their building for more than 5
years said Joe Prondak," who inspects for Quincy.
For many other reasons including that -- the awareness of
the press has become heightened to the issues of homelessness,
tenants can organize, GBLS has become more sophisticated and
others -- many reported, the power of tenants within their
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elationship has become more equal to the that of the landlord's
in recent years. How power is balanced between landlords and
tenants will be a theme throughout this thesis.
B. The Characteristics of Landlord/tenant Interaction:
Having polled many landlords and tenants about their
attitudes towards each other, Michael Stegman claims: "while
there is no evidence that the typical inner-city tenant considers
his landlord a dear and trusted friend, as a whole landlords are
viewed as the enemy less often by their tenants than they are by
22
city officials, housing experts, and others." Especially since
Sternlieb studied landlords in Newark, the belief that the
stereotypical landlord controls city housing inventories has
steadily eroded. What I found exists between landlords and
tenants more closely resembles the biblical phrase: "Do unto
others as you would like them to do unto you." A level of
reciprocity existed between landlords and tenants that governed
much of their interactions.
Some of the landlords and tenants I interviewed did helpful
things for each other as part of their relationship. When John
Swimmer raises his rents -- which he told me he doesn't like to
do but has to -- he usually makes an improvement on the property
in response. "He was a good landlord with fair rents," Joan
Bennis told me about her landlord. "I was also a good
tenant, she also said. "The police have never been over, we
garden, if something minor happens, I'll fix it." Her gar-
22. Stegman, Michael. Housing Investment in the Inner City
Cambridge, MA. MIT Press, 1972
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dening, fixing things, keeping the peace, and her landlord
charging fair rents constituted reciprocity -- each exchanging
being helpful -- that built trust. Said John Swimmer, "As a
landlord I do feel a certain social responsibility if a tenant
calls up at 2 AM to say he doesn't have heat.. as a landlord you
are providing housing which is one of life's necessities."
Their approach to solving problems -- tenants missing rent
payments, damaging the property or disrupting quiet enjoyment,
landlords neglecting maintenance -- at times also reflected this
reciprocity. For example, James Boulder's philosophy has always
been to have personal relationships with his tenants. "I know
their rent-paying histories personally," he told me. "I make it
my practice to take time to talk, to understand their problems as
they bear on our relationship." Boulder felt satisfied by being
helpful, as he told me: "I'm always gratified by someone who
spoke honestly that he has a legitimate problem, arranged with me
to miss a payment and then made it up on an agreed upon schedule.
Many catch up later. I like to both give and take the opportu-
nity to get squared away." Boulder related personally and
extended himself because 'being helpful' was satisfying, and
because it made more certain that he would be paid.
What seems central to this kind of relationship is inter-
dependence. Boulder's tenant depends on Boulder being flexible,
and Boulder depends on his tenant meeting his agreement to repay.
A simpler example is that landlords will offer tenants the chance
to work on their properties in lieu of a portion of the rent; the
tenant saves on the rent while the landlord saves on maintenance.
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Proceeding in court is also a prime example of what increases
interdependence between landlords and tenants. Because of the
high costs and aggravation to evict in court and then to lease to
new tenants, landlords try harder to help tenants to restabilize.
As they referred to their use of court as a "last resort,"
landlords thus became more dependent on the tenant's ability to
restabilize.
Landlords will also become interdependent with tenants who
have trouble paying the rent. Laurie Miller's financial troubles
began when her husband left her (Laurie was Daniel O'Shay's
tenant). "At first," Daniel told me, "she had tried to find an
apartment but as a single unemployed mother with three kids, no
money or work references, it was very difficult. My wife and I
started off being pretty lenient with her knowing it would take
her some time to recover. We first said we understand and just
get it in whenever you can." As O'Shay told me, "it was because
she made promises" and because he "trusted that she would follow
through" that he continued the tenancy without receiving rent for
some time.
In sum, I found a dominant characteristic of the landlord/-
tenant relationship to be reciprocity. Both help each other to
make life more pleasant -- tenants fixed things, landlords offset
rent for work -- which builds mutual trust. When 'being helped'
was more necessary -- a tenant could not pay rent one month --
landlords will carry tenants for some time, trusting the tenant
will reciprocate by following through with their agreement to
repay.
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C. How do Landlord/tenant Relationships Become Unstable?
i. The stages of disputing and the landlord's response to
instability
When parties first become unable to reciprocate is when
disputing first begins. Felstiner, Abel and Sarat (F/A/S) offer
a model for understanding how a lack of reciprocity turns into
23
a dispute. They call this the 'transformation of a dispute'.
It starts when reciprocity first breaks down. For this
breakdown to become a dispute warranting remedial action, as
F/A/S state it, an "unperceived injurious experience must first
be transformed into a perceived injurious experience."
Tenants and landlords must each discern that they are being
mistreated. Tenants, for example, may not say that they believe
they've been mistreated for fear that landlords may attempt to
evict them at a later date. This first transformation --
acknowledging to oneself that a particular experience has been
injurious -- F/A/S call 'naming'. Once a party privately
disagrees with the others' actions -- a tenant believes the
landlord has been neglecting his unit, or the landlord becomes
concerned about late rent payments -- the dispute becomes named.
If parties take the second step, the 'perceived injurious
experience' turns into a 'grievance'. Believing that corrective
action is needed, a landlord, for example, may serve notice of
eviction at this stage, for example, but not plan to follow
23. I have adapted this section from Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat's
model of the stages of disputing. Paper entitled: "The Emer-
gence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming and
Claiming..." (Section quotes all in paper)
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through hoping it will induce the tenant to get out of arrears.
John Swimmer's tenant pulled herself out of arrears two times in
response to his notices, he told me. The third time, he wouldn't
keep her "unless she did something like pay some of my additional
expenses."
As the dispute undergoes it's second transformation, one
party may confront the other because they have been "injured,"
but will ask for reparations in order to restabilize the tenancy.
Expecting this from his tenant, Boulder told me: "I'm not
doubting that there aren't truly needy tenants... 9 times out of
10 though, it's the tenants bad money management and lack of
motivation that leads to their problems paying the rent."
Boulder told me that when he thinks this is the case, he tries to
have face-to-face contact with the tenant -- to re-es-
tablish rapport, listen to their situations, etc. -- in order to
help them do more, which he believes they can do in order to
stabilize.
The third transformation occurs when either landlords decide
to evict tenants or tenants defend themselves against eviction.
At this stage, for example, landlords will cease trying to enable
tenants to restabilize. "Once they stop cooperating with me,"
Swimmer told me, "like not answering the phones, making clear
bluffs, etc., then I'll up my defenses... and hand it to the
legal process [and proceed to evict]." To Boulder, it was not
only that his tenant didn't take advantage of an opportunity to
earn the additional money needed to pay the rent, [instead of
doing overtime, his tenant would play softball and-come home with
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a case of beer] but that he used the money he already had
available for rent instead for something comparatively quite
frivolous Ilike beer, that caused him to decide he must evict his
tenant.
If landlords believed their tenants' excuses were 'legiti-
mate' -- when Laurie Miller's husband left her with the two kids
and no job or money -- their tenants became 'deserving'. If
landlords believed tenants' excuses were not legitimate -- the
Hecklers believed their non-working tenant could work -- "she's
24 years old, healthy, and doesn't have a child" -- they became
less deserving. To the degree that landlords believe that their
tenants are making reasonable efforts to respond to their situa-
tions -- adhering to agreements, being honest, -- however, they
would continue to be flexible. If tenants didn't reciprocate
eventually, landlords would then proceed to stage three -- to
evict. Landlords thus employed this principle of 'desert' to
mediate their internal debates about how far to extend them
24
selves.
Among the types of tenants whose legitimacy landlords might
question are those the Tri-CAP landlord counselor characterized
as "having a lot of drinking, noise and behavioral issues that
prevented them from paying the rent." The director of Quincy's
Rent Grievance Board, Jane Reikard, told me she was less sympa-
thetic toward those tenants who really could work but weren't.
24. It is how landlords distinguish what is a 'legitimate
excuse' that highlights their tensions with tenants. Wolf's
research, discussed later, shows that often the nature of the
tenants' circumstances prevented them from being able to meet
their landlords' expectations.
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I found this principle to be widely applied as a measuring stick
for legitimacy.
The tenant's behavior thus also played a key role in
escalating disputes to this third stage. The Hecklers withdrew
their flexibility primarily because of their tenant's behavior.
"About two weeks after moving in, Kim [the tenant] started having
very big parties that would last through the night, until we had
to call the police. At one of them, there were people roaming on
the roof... there was lots of drinking, and the police arested
her girlfriend for being so drunk. A month after this, DSS
removed her child [for neglect under 51A petition]... a 5 year
old child. The police arrested her twice and her boyfriend once
while upstairs."
Kim stopped paying her share of the Section 8 rent right
after she moved in, according to the Hecklers. "But because she
kept on having parties that were so loud, we lived downstairs
from her... We lost concern about the rent." The Hecklers
tried a few times to construct agreements in which Kim would
improve her behavior in order to stay, but she didn't comply.
25
The Hecklers eventually proceeded in court on nuisance charges
and succeeded in evicting her.
25. A person who participates in the creation of a condition
which materially interferes with the ordinary comfort of human
existence or which is materially detrimental to the reasonable
use or value of property or who allows such a condition after
knowing of it's existence may be found liable for injuries caused
by that condition, known technically as a "nuisance," according
to Massachusetts General Laws. This includes conditions invol-
ving noise, noxious odors, fumes or vermin.
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Along with the 'rent gap', behavioral issues also
break down relationships between landlords and tenants. Land-
lords proceeded to evict much less on the basis of these issues
although they discussed them as quite central to their relation-
ships. A few professionals noted that landlords often disguise
what actually are behavioral disagreements as rent increases.
Said Nancy Callanan, coordinator of Quincy CAP's HSP, for
example: "Most landlords file eviction cases but in reality they
are nuisance cases. Landlords have had it up to their ears with
domestic issues and see no other choice but to evict the tenant,
so they raise the rent in order to create a case for nonpayment
predicting they won't succeed making one for nuisance."
As landlords and tenants progress through the stages of
disputing, thus, the landlord's response to instability is
governed significantly by this value of reciprocity -- that
tenants could respond to their situations by making reasonable
efforts and being accountable. Landlords, however, made a clear
distinction about whose excuses were legitimate, and adjusted
their flexibilities on the basis of }his.
ii. The Tenant's Response to Instability
When dual-purpose landlords and their low income tenants
encounter instability, the criteria landlords develop to deter-
mine how flexible to be include: how responsive tenants have been
previously when they've fallen behind, the legitimacy of their
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excuses, and others. On the surface, tenants facing nonpayment
issues talked the same language of reciprocity and legitimacy.
Jini Fisher, for example, "could understand how he [her landlord]
felt about not getting a paycheck." Whether or not they
believed the rent was reasonable, tenants generally supported the
landlord's right to it.
What actually prevented tenants from being able to respond
as they had wished, they told me, were their 'circumstances',
which typically were difficult. They included making choices at
times between rent and food, coping with destructive marriages,
facing significant emotional and psychological stresses, and
others. Although tenants may believe on one hand that landlords'
requests were legitimate, what was 'reasonable' for tenants to do
in response was often quite different than what landlords
expected.
Jini Fisher is like many other low income mothers whose
financial difficulties exacerbated a range of other problems that
made it even more difficult for them to manage their money
issues. Research conducted by the "Stress and Families Project"
at Harvard University (1980) on tenants like Jini Fisher points
to the intersection of financial and behavioral issues that
low-income tenants bring to their relationships with landlords.
As Barbara Wolf reported in her paper entitled: "The Impact of
Socio-Environmental Stress on the Mental Health of Low-Income
Mothers," low-income mothers are at exceptionally high risk for
depression and other serious psychological disorders. Her
project's findings confirm previous research. Among the findings
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were that:
Low-income mothers experience inordinately stressful
conditions in many areas of their lives concurrently, and many
individual stressful conditions correlate significantly with
mental health indicators. For example, two-thirds of the mothers
(tested) had primary child care responsibility, and only half got
away from their children on any regular basis other than work.
One-fourth had no time away. Parenting conditions correlated
significantly with depression, with mothers who lacked child care
assistance at highest risk.
Among the many stressful conditions investigated, financial
stress -- both income level itself as well as financial unpre-
dictability and insecurity -- emerged as the single most potent
factor predisposing people to have psychological disorder.
Besides correlating with mental health indicators, financial
stress was rated subjectively as the most stressful area of their
lives. It correlated with respondents' subjective feelings of
worry and upset in other areas of their lives.
The project conclusions were that "women on welfare are
stigmatized, seen as less than human, and responsible for their
own poverty and misery... by labelling... recipients as dis-
honest, society is able to justify the controlling regulations of
public welfare. In addition, the women often internalize these
stigmas, blaming themselves and feeling dehumanized, unworthy of
esteem."
In the public housing project where Barbara Wolf lived, she
observed the pervasive feeling of tenants being "out of control
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of what happens to you." Uncontrollable events and conditions
were constant, daily experiences, and had multiple sources. Wolf
found the housing project mothers had a common colloquial
expression to refer to such experiences: It was "trouble."
One source of this "trouble" was inadequate income -- a
stolen or missing welfare check, unexpected cut in wages etc. --
that triggered an unpredictable financial emergency -- no money.
At other times, the source of trouble was an unexpected personal
or familial stressful event -- losing a job, a family member
becoming seriously ill -- that compounded financial stress and
made it nearly impossible for mothers to adapt to or cope with
the original stress. Feeling 'out of control' but trying to
'manage' their financial crises, tenants like Laurie Miller may
often create further "trouble" by going to work illegally, (ie.
without informing the welfare department), or borrowing money
from a loan shark who may soon after begin to harrass or threaten
them. TThe tenants I interviewed faced the same kinds of "trou-
ble." When Laurie kept re-promising to become stable again to
keep O'Shay flexible while facing a personal crisis, her very
efforts to become stable may have exacerbated her problems.
Another tenant, Jeannie Bendix told me: "I had a restraining
order out on my husband but was so afraid he would come back any
day to hurt me. I felt so out of control, like I was being
ripped to shreds by everyone," she continued. "I remember
opening up the refrigerator and there was only cheese and bread,
it was so scary thinking I might end up in a shelter... like a
nightmare. But I most wanted to let my kids know-they were
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still loved."
But unlike some tenants, this tenant pulled herself together
because things were so difficult. "I can still pull hard even
when things get so bad," Jeannie told me. "I couldn't imagine
living like those people in the shelters... having no money for
food. It took a lot for me to go on welfare. I became very
determined that I would make it in this world."
As tenants reported, their financial crises were mixed
together with other problems -- of family breakups, loss of
employment, violence etc. -- that made them more likely to bluff
and to not keep agreements. Professionals who I interviewed
discussed also how tenants' difficulties managing kitchens,
taking care of children and handling other domestic affairs also
became disruptions to the landlords. What to the landlord looks
like 'the tenant isn't regaining stability' to tenants may
represent their best attempts to restabilize given the multiple
problems faced on top of their financial ones.
I have been separating out as well as weaving together the
respective characteristics that landlords and tenants bring to
their relationship when it becomes unstable. Dual-purpose
landlords require regular rent payments and an atmosphere free
from behavioral and social disruptions and will be flexible with
tenants who become unstable based on some degree of reciproca-
tion. Accompanying the financial problems of these low income
tenants, however, are a host of social and behavioral problems
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that threaten joint tenure. Low income tenants are thus often
not able to provide what their landlords need.
Although landlords recognize this, they spoke most strongly
about being 'over-burdened' by a problem which they felt belonged
more between the state and the tenants. John Swimmer spoke for
many as he told me: "Landlords are not a social service agency."
After Len Simon acted like a caseworker for his tenant -- lining
up jobs and arranging for daycare -- he felt frustrated by
having to act "like a welfare agency." Swimmer likened his
situation to a grocery store owner facing someone needing food
but having no money. "He [the owner] simply can't just say give
me what you have. It's very sad. The tenant doesn't have the
right to take bread off the shelf without paying for it. Home-
lessness should not be totally the burden of the landlord."
At some point, either the landlord or the tenant will 'draw
the line', and decide not to try to be helpful to the other, even
if to help themselves as well. At this point, eviction becomes a
certain prospect.
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CHAPTER 5: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN EVICTION IS A CERTAIN PROSPECT?
In the previous section, I discussed the conditions that
exacerbate instability within the relationship between landlords
and tenants. Focussing specifically on cases where issues of
either rent or behavior surfaced, I've described how landlords
and tenants interact in order to save joint tenure, if possible.
Once the landlord's frame shifts from 'how can I manage this
problem so I don't have to evict' to 'I have no choice but to
evict if I am to protect my interests', his or her strategies
typically shift. When the tenant's frame shifts from 'what can I
do to meet landlords expectations', or 'prevent the eviction
issue from surfacing' to 'how can I keep myself from being
evicted', their strategies shift also. Both stop thinking about
their mutual interests and each begins to focus on protecting his
or her own interests only.
Although I distinguish what happens when eviction is a
certain prospect in this section, it's important to recognize
that eviction is always a prospect once instability begins. The
line between 'managing instability' and either 'the tenant being
evicted' or 'the landlord selling' shifts at different points for
many reasons. One landlord with whom I talked "carried" her
tenant for 18 months "because she felt sorry for them." Others
'think eviction' the first few days tenants are late paying rent.
It is when landlords and tenants 'shift their strategies', for
discussion purposes, that they 'formally encounter' the issue of
eviction within their relationship.
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A. A continuum of methods
Just as eviction is always a prospect, any one of a range of
methods is also always a prospect for landlords and tenants
throughout the tenancy to help them resolve disputes. Whereas
conflict resolution programs like Community Boards Inc. aim to
use informal methods as early as possible in order to prevent
26
disputes from escalating, the critical legal theory advocates
believe that because disputes often reflect fundamental inequa-
lities which the mistreated party should redress, escalating the
dispute to the formal arena may help that party and its 'class'
gain more power.
We can conceive of these methods as existing on a continuum
of three general categories in which landlords and tenants
address their disputes, ordered from least to most formal.
Continuum of Dispute Resolution Methods
Self-Help (Least formal)
Dispute is resolved pri-
vately by parties (no pro-
fessional involvement)
Informal (Most) formal
Use of 3rd party services Legal pos-
to counsel parties about turing,
options and help resolve use of
dispute through negoti- attorneys
ation or mediation (HSP
and local forums)
26. Ray Shonholtz, the founder of Community Boards Inc. in San
Francisco, defines success broadly as the ability for disputants
to control the process and construct agreements themselves. The
more formal the process, Shonholtz argues, the less power the
disputants have over it and hence the less satisfaction with it
and its outcome. Perpetuating the norm that parties should file
court cases, Shonholtz argues extends, weakens the disputant's
initiative to discover what common ground may exist between the
parties because they know they can use the courts and police to
prevent a violent resolution if necessary)
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- In the self-help category, the parties resolve disputes
privately, exercising the most control themselves of all methods.
Because my research involved only those cases where professionals
were involved, however, I define self-help as private procedures
that are influenced by GBLS and HSP.
- The informal methods feature a neutral 3rd party -- a
neighbor, local minister, HSP counselors or mediators -- who may
help the parties to define the problem, explore options and then
build agreements that are satisfactory to both, if possible.
Suzann and Leonard Buckle discovered that such a person, who they
called the "neighborhood notable," exists. They define him or
her as "someone commonly recognized as well-versed in the law,
cognizant of rights and responsibilities of citizens and res-
pected as an advisor on neighborhood conerns" -- to whom neigh-
bors would take their problems."
- Most formally, the parties each invoke the law to win the
most from the other. Both often employ attorneys, who, if they
don't succeed through negotiation, end up before the judge. The
parties themselves typically have the least control over the
outcome once attorneys and judges become involved.
Although legal principles alone are employed when the
parties come before the judge, when they negotiate more infor-
27
mally, they may 'jointly invent objective criteria' in which
27. Inventing Objective criteria' refers to a technique Fisher
and Ury discuss in their book entitled: "Getting to Yes";
Negotiating with objective criteria, to Fisher and Ury, may
include the following elements:
1. Reason and be open to reason as to which standards are
most appropriate and how they should be applied.
2. Frame each issue as a joint search for objective crite-
ria 3. Never yield to pressure, only to principle.
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they focus more on their interests rather than positions in order
to work more collaboratively to be able to increase each parties'
gains. Invoking the law typically results in a more distributive
process -- the more one wins, the more the other loses -- which
leads the parties to become more adversarial than when objective
criteria are applied.
B. The role that the law and the courts play within the rela-
tionship between landlords and tenants
The law and the court system in which it is most formally
applied have quite a pervasive impact on how landlords and
tenants resolve their disputes in this country. Within whichever
method along the continuum they choose for resolving matters, the
law and the courts provide a frame. Both the knowledge each
party has about the law and the skills they possess to apply it
will determine how successfully one or the other party can
negotiate within this frame to maximize his or her own interests.
On the most formal end where the judge decides the outcome,
in which we know the most, the landlord will almost certainly win
according to some prelimary research I did on judicial outcomes
at Quincy District Court (QDC). Below I present aggregated data
28
from cases entering the summary process court dockets from Aug.
15th 1988 to February 15th, 1989.
28. Eviction cases are called "Summary Process" actions and by
law are designed to "process" the landlord's case swiftly (e.g.)
in a "summary" fashion, as stated by Paul Shack in Legal Tactics:
Self-Defense for Tenants in Massachusetts. Boston, MA. MA.
Poverty Law Center, 1987
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Aggregated Data from Summary Process Docket of
Quincy District Court
# of Cases studied: 300
1. Of those cases where a decision was made -- either the
landlord succeeded in eviction or the tenant remained, in what %
of cases did the landlord win vs. the tenant?
a. # of cases in which either landlord or tenant won: 223
b. # and percentage of cases landlord won; 220, (99%)
c. # and percentage of cases tenant won; 3, (1%)
2. For-those landlord victories, what was the average monetary
compensation rewarded?
Average monetary compensation awarded to landlord: $1920
3. For how many cases did the landlord not win any money
except for court filing fees? (approximately $75-$100)
For 18 cases, compensation to landlords ranged between $75
and $100.
4. What percentage of the landlords and tenants had legal
representation?
a. 103, (or 65%), of the private landlords were represented.
b. 116, (or 83%) of the commercial landlords were represen-
ted.
c. 8% of the tenants were represented.
Although landlords, as we know, will typically use the court
"as a last resort" to avoid the expense, time delays and aggra-
vation, when the judge decides, the landlords won 99% of the
time.
Most cases, though, never make it to court. Marc Galanter,
of Wisconsin's Civil Litigation Research Project determined that
only 1 in 10 people who started out with a grievance ever made it
to a lawyer; and furthermore, that only 1 in 67 pressed it to a
29
final judicial resolution. Most of these cases are resolved
29. (Author unstated), "Debunking Litigation Magic," in Newsweek
Magazine, November 21, 1983
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within the self-help category without any professional involve-
ment. Because most landlords and tenants resolve their disputes
privately, they are affected more greatly by the role the law and
the courts play in their private actions than when they are in
court.
In this private arena, both the law and it's role within the
courts provide a frame around which landlords and tenants
dispute. Mnookin and Kornhauser call it a "bargaining endowment"
-- a set of "counters" to be used in bargaining between dispu-
tants. They use a divorce case to illustrate this. (1979:968)
".... [t]he legal rules governing alimony, child support, marital
property and custody give each parent certain claims based on
what each would get if the case went to trial. In other words,
the outcome that the law would impose if no agreement is reached
gives each parent certain bargaining chips -- an endowment of
sorts."
Once landlords and tenants understand the law, they may
negotiate in the "shadow of the law" (Mnookin) using legal
principles to strike agreements in which both parties are
satisfied. As Jack Hall stated, "it's a lot easier [for land-
lords] to be nice if they've got all the cards on their side. I
advise them to serve tenants with every form possible, start a
summary process and then start negotiating. Then they can say:
I'm ready to cut you a break if you x, y and z." If the parties,
conversely, don't know what their rights are under law when they
undergo their negotiation process, I will illustrate soon, they
may end up reversing their momentum and becoming less flexible.
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There is much disagreement, however, as to how 'knowledgeable'
landlords and tenants are about the law.
Linda Garcia, on one hand, believes tenants will begin to
think about their rights and end up making a defense because they
face so few options. "Although they think when first served that
they'll have to move immediately, now they make that call to the
social worker or they reach someone whose had a similar situ-
ation," says Garcia. Jack Hall, on the other hand, cites an
Massachusetts Tenants Organization (MTO) study which found that
only 25,000 tenants of all who live in Boston's 75,000 registered
units are registered voters, to infer that if so few tenants in
registered units vote as an indication that they know the law,
then there is a great deal of ignorance about it.
One result when tenants don't know the law is that they may
leave upon demand 'in order not to confront the landlord in court
whether or not he had just grounds. "I was so scared I thought I
wouldn't be able to speak if I went before the judge... I was
feeling so upset that I almost felt I should go...." Another
result was that tenants withstood substandard conditions or
unreasonable rent increases fearing eviction if they resist.
Carol Burner counseled a tenant who didn't report that he didn't
have heat for 10 months "because he was anxiety-prone and didn't
want to generate any problems [with the landlord]."
When tenants applied the law, and their legal grounds were
legitimate, however, they could succeed. When Mary Bishop's
landlord notified her that she was going to be evicted for
"nuisance" reasons, the grounds of which were illegal, Mary stood
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her legal ground. She hired a lawyer and got the case dismissed
30
in court.
If landlords don't know how to defend themselves legally,
they are likely to flounder when they begin the process of
eviction, as many cases illustrated. Especially for small land-
lords who are typically the least well-educated legally, as Hall
tells me, "lots of times they will make 2 or 3 bad moves like
shutting off the water because they don't know the law, which
only compounds the problem rather than to begin working with the
tenants." Thus, when landlords are ignorant of the law, their
very attempts to protect their interests may makes things worse.
It is when joint tenure becomes threatened and eviction is a
certain prospect that landlords and tenants typically consult
with professionals -- whose degree of control increases the more
formal a method they employ along the continuum. I presented a
matrix earlier in Chapter 1 (pg 18) for how and when HSP and GBLS
should interact with parties in order to preserve joint tenure.
I will now discuss how they operate -- how they frame the
disputes between landlords and tenants, and what they do in
response -- and will afterwards discuss the response of the
parties to the professionals.
30. Although my data shows that tenants were represented legally
at Quincy District Court only 8% of the time, we cannot infer,
however, that if tenants were legally represented in court they
would be more likely to win. A sizable proportion (35%) of the
private landlords who won were not represented.
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C. How do Professionals become involved?
I have been discussing the culture in which landlords and
tenants manage their relationship when joint tenure is threa-
tened. They each behave according to values, norms and beliefs
in order to restabilize their relationship and to preserve joint
tenure, if this is possible. What they know about the law and
how to apply it may significantly alter their negotiating
behavior. At some point in the process, some opt to use profes-
sionals. Out of the range of approaches professionals may use,
I have simplified them down to two generic frames which reflect
the two professional services I have studied -- the 'legal-ne-
gotiation' frame as represented by GBLS, and the 'counseling-
-negotiation-mediation' frame as represented by HSP. Within each
frame, I will discuss later, are variations which, when 'matched'
with a particular landlord/tenant relationship, will either widen
or contract the negotiating room between them.
These professional groups generally agree about the problem
as defined by the growing income gap. As a result of this gap --
between what landlords are charging and what tenants can afford
-- the number of legal evictions occurring at Quincy District
Court, for example, has increased 66% from 1983-88, from
31
501 to 828. Recall that median Boston rents have increased by
329% since 1970 and the number of 'poor' families has increased
by 18% since 1980. Reducing this gap, most all agree, will
31. Dick Bauer of Quincy GBLS reported this figure at a forum
sponsored by Quincy CAP in April, 1989.
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remove a key obstacle to resolving the problems of affordable
housing and homelessness.
Representatives from both groups also acknowledge that the
'system' -- of public and private sector activities which produce
the resources of housing and human services -- should be im-
proved. They acknowledge as well that it's unfair that society
has placed much of this problem onto landlords and tenants.
They agree that the state can be a more 'effective agent' though
they disagree about if this means necessarily spending more.
What kinds of improved responses they do suggest the state should
make often differs; as does the way each defines the problem and
the techniques each uses to work with each client. I will first
present the approaches of both professionals and then discuss the
response of landlords and tenants and the role of the state.
i. GREATER BOSTON LEGAL SERVICES FRAME
GBLS operates a multi-facetted legal assistance program for
low income persons residing in the city of Boston and in 25
surrounding communities. It was established in 1975 by the
merger of the Boston Legal Aid Society, dating back to 1900, and
the Boston Legal Assistance Project.
GBLS uses an individual's income as their primary criteria
for determining who qualifies for their services. In 1988, a
family of four who was earning less than $1200/month (approx.) or
an individual earning less than $600 qualified. This rules out
all property owners, according to Jay Rose, (a GBLS attorney)
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except for those who don't derive any rental income from their
properties and have very low incomes.
Although GBLS works daily, case-by-case, representing and
educating tenants in order to preserve their affordable housing
and keep them from being evicted, they define the problem of
preventing homelessness and preserving affordable housing more
largely in terms of 'rights'. Couched in a larger vision that
"supplies moral principle to developing a comprehensive
32
housing policy for the commonwealth." these 'rights' are spelled
out in a proposed amendment which GBLS and others have sponsored.
As excerpted, "All people are born free and equal and have
certain natural, essential and unalienable rights; among which
are; .... that of occupying habitable and affordable non-tran-
sient housing...." By framing the problem in this manner, GBLS
provides sufficient grounds for working only on behalf of those
people whose rights they believe are being threatened -- low
income tenants.
To protect tenants whose tenancies are being threatened,
GBLS has established a series of goals, as stated in their 1988
Housing Unit Plan. They are to:
1. Preserve and increase supply of decent, safe and
affordable housing. The primary work of GBLS' here is
legislative.
2. Expand provision of services to those in "protected
groups" to combat housing discrimination. This includes
fair housing cases.
32. MA. Chapter of the National Lawyers Guild (author), Legal
Tactics: Self-Defense for Tenants in Massachusetts; Section
written by Smizik, Frank I., entitled: The Right to Housing
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3. Expand Tenants' awareness of and excercise of their
rights; and deter lawlessness by private and public actors.
4. Prevent displacement of tenants and help secure afforda-
ble housing for those who are or may become homeless.
GBLS's approach when relationships between landlords and
tenants become unstable is primarily to invoke the law to defend
tenants against eviction. Due to tight resources, (exacerbated
over the past 10 years by Reagan's fight to dismantle GBLS
altogether), GBLS must limit it's direct client service. Jay
Rose, a GBLS attorney, estimates GBLS must reject 5 out of 6
cases for full representation. GBLS also does not have the
resources to represent tenants in "for-cause" cases -- for
example, those in which there is suspected evidence of drug use
or other illegal activities by the tenant. GBLS hopes the gains
they achieve against landlords from the cases they do 'try' may
deter other landlords from acting similarly. The bulk of GBLS's
work involves providing training and a pro se kit for tenants to
exercise their legal rights themselves.
GBLS works to stop evictions altogether, if possible, or to
delay them long enough for tenants either to reinstate themselves
or to move smoothly into new housing. To achieve their objec-
tives -- "preserving and increasing safe, decent and affordable
housing" -- (GBLS Housing Unit Plan 1988), they advocate for
tenants only, and generally do not attend to protecting the
interests of the landlords. (GBLS policy permits them to
represent low-income homeowners but income guidelines prohibit
most any who provide rental property from using their services).
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To do this, an attorney told me, means; "We don't go in
questioning what would the landlord think... that's not our job,
to look at it in a balanced way. We go into it thinking what do
we have to use as proof, not thinking if this is fair to the
landlord... And being advocates only for tenants makes our job a
bit easier."
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The Pro Se kit which GBLS put together in 1982 encapsulates
it's frame, as I quote and use capital letters as the kit uses
them. "If you are faced with an eviction,... IT IS AGAINST THE
LAW for your landlord to physically throw you out, change the
locks, turn off the heat or lights etc. The only way your
landlord can legally get you out is to go to court to evict you.
If he does, you can fight the eviction in court.... If you can
get a lawyer, you should,... otherwise, you need to know how to
handle your eviction case yourself..... REMEMBER -- NO MATTER HOW
GOOD YOUR CASE, YOU WILL BE EVICTED IF YOU DON'T DEFEND YOUR-
SELF.... and whatever you do may increase the chances of stopping
or delaying the eviction. There are two basic types of defenses
-- Your landlord has violated your rights as a tenant, and your
landlord has not followed all eviction rule..."
As GBLS attorneys interpret their role, their first obstacle
is to overcome the tenant's intimidation. According to one
attorney, "you have to advocate for them, tell them what their
rights are, and push them as far as they're willing to be
pushed.... but you still can't play God and say you should do
33. Pro se means to represent oneself legally in court. GBLS
offers its' clients a pro se kit for them to use to invoke the
law with minimal use of attorneys. Pro se materials wer produced
by Susan Cohen and William H. Abrashkin, 1982
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this and we're gonna make you do something." Another attorney
plays harder. "We simply should not just say [to the clients]
what do you want. We should tell them what we think they need,
giving them information and a recommendation." Their overall
goal here, though, is to help tenants to tap their motivation for
defending their rights and to advocate to maximize their own gain
as an outcome to their dispute.
Assuming the landlord has a legal basis for evicting the
tenant, then as part of the court process, the tenant's defense
may be to hold him accountable for following the exact letter of
the law for any and all statutes that he or his attorney may
discover, including the eviction proceeding itself. Citing these
may delay the proceedings, win them financial compensation and
even stop the eviction altogether.
A GBLS attorney put it this way: "When we first get a
nonpayment case, we will look at everything,... to see if the
landlord has done everything correctly. Was the notice filed
correctly, security deposit, etc. Next I will look at code
violations, which I'll learn by basically listening to the
tenants description of the situation." And another attorney
continued; "[a]nd there almost always is some kind of procedural
problem [on the landlord's part].... because you know there's a
fairly good chance of dismissing the case because the landlord's
goofed up, you definitely go ahead and do that, which provides
more time for the tenant."
For those dual-purpose landlords who want to keep non-sub-
sidized tenants but can't meet these demands, GBLS-currently, as
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a rule, will not protect them from facing these procedures.
Against whatever type of landlord our clients face, Jay Rose told
me, our goal is to prevent evictions whether or not we can
provide full representation. If (dual-purpose) landlords might
go under if they are forced to meet all GBLS's demands, Rose
suggested, then sometimes GBLS will "blink" (Rose) at the more
minor violations in order to keep these landlords afloat.
In response to the claim by dual-purpose landlords that they
can't protect themselves', GBLS attorneys raised diverging views
-- about which cases they should handle -- that Rose says
reflects both policy debate and their financial constraints.
Although one GBLS attorney told me that "we [GBLS] still feel
internally that we have to take a hard line stand on these small
[dual-purpose] landlords," Rose told me GBLS is debating the idea
of placing those type-cases as a lower priority for full repre-
sentation.
Within my model service system, GBLS here would act more
like HSP to keep them from turning dual-purpose landlords into
problem-becoming mode. Because GBLS cannot learn much about the
smaller landlords' financial constraints for the following
reasons -- GBLS defends against too many, doesn't have the
resources and is restricted to doing intake with their clients
only -- Rose told me, it is very hard for GBLS to be able to make
these determinations.
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ii. THE HOUSING SERVICES PROGRAM FRAME
EOCD's Housing Services Program is the other primary
professional service approach which I have researched, whose
approach I have named the counseling-negotiation-mediation frame.
As their brochure states, "The HSP offers an inexpensive,
effective way of assisting low-income tenants and homeowners to
remain in their existing housing." Along with providing tech-
nical assistance and workshops, HSP provides education, counse-
ling and dispute resolution services. During 1987, for example,
4700 landlords received counseling; 11,500 tenants received
34
counseling, 4279 of which required extensive assistance.
Tri-CAP, the local HSP on which I most focussed my research,
received 750 odd housing-related tenant calls in 1988 that were
split evenly between eviction issues, code violations and rent
increases.
The typical landlord they serve, according to HSP, owns one
building rented to low-income tenants. 52% of them are owner
occupants and typically wish to keep the tenant in the unit. Of
those tenants served, 66% are female heads of households with
income below the federal poverty guidelines. 44% of them are
minorities.
Whereas GBLS works specifically to protect the rights and
interests of tenants only by defending them against landlords,
HSP works towards protecting the rights and interests of both
landlords and tenants by collaborating with both of them
34. Information presented in Housing Services Program brochure
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Relying not only on the law but on reality-testing and mediation
techniques, HSP seeks to uncover and address those underlying
issues -- particulaly behavior issues that don't come under the
'for cause' category -- that often go unrecognized yet seriously
threaten joint tenure.
As does GBLS 'educate' and 'train' tenants via their clinics
and pro se kit, HSP staff 'counsels' both tenants and landlords.
Helena Chaikins described counseling as "laying out what I see as
the options at that point.... and then helping them both to
decide the value that each of those options has for them and to
choose the most appropriate one." "The counselor's job," to
Grace McKinnon, who works with Chelsea's HSP, "is to separate out
the issues for the party.... it's critical that our advocates use
counseling skills and get at the emotional issues which are
always a significant part of the dispute."
Using the skills of a counselor -- listening, validating,
and clarifying and others -- counselors may begin to surface
those issues that cannot be addressed by using legal defenses
alone. As Nancy Callanan described, "she [the tenant] let her
baby's diapers regularly go loose in the house which leaked into
the hallway causing smells that became serious issues that
threatened the tenancy. Because she doesn't know basic mothering
skills, my job then became to teach tenants how to live sani-
tarily as tenants, [for which I have very limited time]." Nancy
frames the problem here as how to surface the underlying issues
on which there may be negotiating room. She hopes that achieving
agreements on these issues will revive landlords' motivations to
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strike agreements on the other issues.
My research illustrated that landlords will be more flexible
based on even minor (although some) evidence that tenants can
reciprocate. It is for those disputes where the gap is 'brid-
geable' through negotiation and mediation that counselors seek to
build the confidence of these landlords by helping tenants to
find ways of reciprocating. Because GBLS typically does not
investigate if landlords may still be flexible and proceeds to
defend tenants assuming they are not, landlords may become
inflexible in response because GBLS avoids making much effort to
help tenants to reciprocate. Rather than to assume without
investigating that landlords already are inflexible, HSP instead
assumes that landlords may be flexible and will continue to
remain so if HSP can increase their confidence that tenants can
make changes.
To increase their confidence and thus enable them to
'bridge' their differences, Helena advocates that tenants tell
landlords as early as possible about their situations. "When
landlords first put rent increases into effect, Helena tells me,
if the tenants simply pay the increase without any defenses, they
will then become legally obligated to pay it, but will likely not
be able to pay it a couple months later, which will make things
worse. If I can get them into mediation earlier," Helena
continues, "they can work out a lower increase or a graduated one
which the tenant will be able to handle." Because she has heard
landlords often tell her "if she [the tenant] had only told
me,... they [the landlords] resent having been kept in the dark,"
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she believes that if landlords can address issues early enough
through negotiation, many times they will be more willing and
able to be flexible.
HSP works towards discovering if gaps in both behavior and
rent are bridgeable by helping parties to understand what is
well-founded about the issue at hand. HSP calls this 'reality-
testing'. Nancy Callanan reminds landlords, who tell her their
only option is eviction, "how costly, time-consuming and diffi-
cult it will be, although it's their choice." Grace McKinnon
"educates" tenants whose tenancies are "preservable" yet who
refuse to comply with the landlords' requests -- to improve their
behavior or begin to repay the rent -- that "if they don't
[comply], the landlord will legitimately confront you and the
judge also will likely not respond positively."
Reality-testing may surface 'unreasonable' financial
situations facing either landlords or tenants. For those
problem-causing landlords who seek rent increases that were
'unreasonable' both as a percentage increase and relative to
comparable apartments, Helena will alert tenants that they should
defend themselves by using services like GBLS. Similarly, for
those tenants who just won't be able to bridge the rent 'gap'
unless a subsidy is available, which Helena knows she cannot
assume, Helena "doesn't think it pays for them to prolong it [the
eviction]. Even if they were able to defend against eviction
case on code violations, the landlord can turn around, repair
them and start the eviction process again," she told me.
How HSP staff defines "success" correlated with these
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practices. According to Grace McKinnon, "We say we get 80%
success, meaning that 80% of the time the parties got something
they both wanted, even if they agreed that the tenant would
leave." Josh Jacks told me that if they were "either preserving
tenancies or facilitating communication, then they were doing
their job, because the prevention of homelessness doesn't always
mean the continuation of the tenancy." In fact, of the 40
mediations Tri-CAP did in 1988 where the parties struck agree-
ment, the tenant agreed to leave the unit in about half (20) of
them according to Jacks' estimate. A tenant may agree to leave,
Jacks told me, because they believed they would secure new
housing although Jacks says he is limited to do follow up to find
out if this actually occurred.
Unlike GBLS, though, what HSP may provoke in order to make
landlords 'have to' do something is dependent on their choice of
whether or not to participate. Consequently, problem-causing
landlords will often determine if they are willing to extend
further before they take part. When they have already decided
they won't extend further -- that under no conditions will they
consider keeping the tenant -- HSP staff generally believe they
will typically choose not to use their services. Because the
costs to evict -- in money, time and aggravation -- are so high,
however, these problem-causing landlords may use HSP -- but, to
be able to evict less expensively or to win the best terms for
themselves only. HSP must then protect the tenants from these
landlords -- either by referring them to GBLS or by best applying
their skills, the law and reason -- when these landlords refuse
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to be flexible. Unlike HSP, GBLS can be more successful at pro-
tecting tenants against these landlords who refuse to negotiate
and be reasonable.
My research will show that GBLS turns dual-purpose landlords
into problem-causing types when GBLS does not integrate their
needs and interests into the dispute resolution process. HSP
aims instead to do as much as possible to meet dual-purpose
landlords' needs and interests so that they may withdraw from
wanting to evict tenants. For many of these cases, Tri-CAP staff
told me, there were issues of both money and behavior. Jacks
provided an example of a typical agreement.
- The tenant agrees to not leave the trash in the hallway
and will lock the door to the common areas.
- The tenant will agree not to play the stereo after 9 PM
and will ask his children to do the same.
- The tenant understands that the rent is due on 1st of the
month and agrees to pay it.
- The landlord agrees to accept rental assistance program
funds for rent payments.
- If problems arise with the heating system, the landlord
agrees to respond by the next day.
- If the landlord needs access to the apartment, he will
give 1-2 days advance notice and will not go into the
apartment when the tenant isn't there.
Being able to build agreements to which both parties would
commit increased their willingness to continue joint tenure. Each
parties' commitments extended only as far, however, as she
trusted the other to meet her obligations. For both parties to
be willing to enter into such agreements and to stay committed to
them, some told me, they needed HSP to monitor the parties. One
technique Grace used to leverage the parties to uphold their
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agreements was to tell them that "whoever breaks it will be in
jeopardy before the judge." HSP staff told me, though, that
they are very limited both in time and resources to be able to
monitor agreements. It is this area, I will discuss later, where
I believe HSP can do more.
D. The Response by Landlords and Tenants to the
Professionals
In this section, I will discuss my research results on how
landlords and tenants said they responded to the roles of GBLS
and HSP.
i. The Impact of HSP
Landlords and tenants did shift toward dual-purpose mode as
a result of HSP's intervention. After Sheila Payson was coun-
selled by HSP, she "sent some rent money to her landlord in
advance of the mediation" as she told me, which showed good
faith. When a landlord found out that her tenant had missed rent
payments because she was laid off temporarily, she became much
more flexible and agreed to a repayment plan.
HSP's ability to counsel on a wide variety of problems that
threatened joint tenure also kept landlords from withdrawing
their flexibility. In one way, counselors who recognized that
tenants would lose out because they were so intimidated, would
work hard to convince them that they did have some rights. As
Helena told me: "It's hard to convince tenants that they can
exercise their rights. I help them realize they at least have
some time [before they have to leave]."
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In another way, counselors who recognized that tenants were
perpetrating' the most by repeatedly disobeying doing basic
chores, being loud and unsanitary, they would sit down with them
to teach them some skills with what limited time was available.
They would also help these tenants 'face reality' about the risks
of being evicted if they didn't make some improvements.
Landlords and tenants believed that HSP could do more,
however, to build their confidence in the agreements they struck.
For O'Shay to have remained flexible, he told me, he would have
needed his mediator to "write up a strict agreement -- which the
tenant would have to abide by -- that would be monitored after a
month. If the tenant couldn't comply, he would then go to
court." Frank Kessler asked his mediator if he could request
that the tenant report to him about his status vis-a-vis compli-
ance." If HSP increased their monitoring, landlords told me,
they would be less likely to withdraw from their agreements.
Although this works in the reverse -- tenants pushing
landlords to comply to keep tenants from invoking the law to
force compliance -- I did not uncover any examples of this
because of the limited number and type of landlords and tenants
whom I interviewed.
The role mediation played helped push both landlords and
tenants to stay in dual-purpose mode. For Kessler, mediation
"put a jolt, some formality into the process. I didn't think
they [my tenants] could realize how serious the consequences
would be if they didn't pay the rent [they'd become homeless]
until Jacks [the mediator] jumped in. And they started to pay
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it." For Sheila, her landlord became flexible, as this landlord
told me, because she learned through mediation that Sheila's
money problems were only temporary -- they had not been able to
discuss this on their own. "I believed she [the landlord] was
trying to evict me," Sheila told me, "but when she learned
[through mediation] that I had been out of work, she changed her
attitude."
ii. The Impact of GBLS
The role GBLS played or threatened to play helped a number
of landlords to withdraw their problem-causing behaviors. "When
GBLS came in," Swimmer told me, "they found a loophole in the
law, posted a code violation and then used it, which was fair."
"When I learned from GBLS that I was in violation and had to
install a buzzer system for $1800," another told me, "I improved
myself as a landlord." When Joan Bennis' landlord cited her
illegally on nuisance charges, her attorney developed her case,
which forced her landlord to negotiate and led Joan to become
able to stay in her unit. As a result of GBLS's role, Quincy
HSP director (Nancy Callanan) told me, "many landlords are
demanding more mediation services because they predict they'll
lose significantly if they go up against GBLS." GBLS thus
prevents problem-causing landlords from winning at their actions
and it pushes them to start acting more in dual-purpose mode.
Interviewees expressed that GBLS had a much stronger impact,
however, in shifting landlords and tenants from dual-purpose into
problem-becoming mode. Many of the landlords with-whom I spoke
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had spent additional $1000's to cover non-collected rents, repair
damages, compensate for code violations and fees for their
attorneys -- in order to evict tenants, some of whom would be
classified as "problem-causing." This made them feel very bitter
about and retaliatory against the role of GBLS. They have also
become quite vindictive and have begun to shift from dual-purpose
into problem-becoming mode. "As a result of this [GBLS interven-
tion]," one told me, " now I am very seriously considering
selling it off to condos."
One way in which GBLS and tenants work together -- that
effects this shift -- is in how tenants used the pro se (self-
help) kits which they received from GBLS. When Suzann and
Leonard Buckle studied how tenants used the pro se kit, they
found that (many) tenants "waved the kit" in front of the
landlord saying (paraphrased): 'Don't you try evicting me because
I know my defenses and you'll pay for it'.
The way in which tenants learned how to apply GBLS strate-
gies to issues -- that were tangential to the primary ones --
convinced landlords that these tenants were mis-applying the
knowledge that GBLS had taught them. Just after GBLS had
consulted with Pam Brinner's tenant, for example, Pam faced an
issue when she tried to obtain a rent subsidy for her (mother's)
tenant. "Because she said she was eligible," Pam Brinner told
me, "I sought this out but soon discovered she wasn't [eligi-
ble].... Because I raised the issue [of eligibility] and also of
how she will now become able to make rent payments, she [the
tenant] went immediately to the Board of Health to -bring charges
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against me."
Once landlords learned that the shifts tenants made into
problem-becoming mode occurred right after they had received
GBLS's services, they told me, they shifted most directly and
quickly into problem-becoming modes. "It was after she got
Legal Services help that I believe she started threatening me,"
John Swimmer told me. "On that second hearing day," Len Simon
said, "she had just been told by legal services to cite me
because there were no batteries in the smoke detector; I had
actually inserted them but she had taken them out. They [GBLS]
told her to complain about the heat but she didn't even think
there was any heat problem before legal services got involved."
As a further example, another landlords' tenants learned
that he [the landlord] had not signed a statement 14 years
earlier relinquishing his obligation to pay utility bills
(although the tenant had agreed verbally to pay the landlord)
the tenants told him: "Now we won't pay anything and if you try
to evict us, we'll sue you for everything you have including
every back utility bill." To this landlord, this was "legal aid
[who] was talking."
What this effected in these landlords, they say, is a
withdrawal in the negotiating room which they had still expected
to exercise. "If there were any chance that she could reinstate
rent payments with public monies, family help, a schedule to get
out of arrears, whatever," Simon told me, "I would have kept her.
Instead of making at least some effort to try to improve things
between us, when she turned hard line using GBLS to make all
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these new claims which until then were not problems to her, I
withdrew being flexible."
"We were trying to convince her not to have those loud
parties." the Hecklers said, "so we wouldn't have to file
nuisance charges which she promised not to do, but after she got
legal services, she refused to talk to us and the parties
resumed." It was the effect GBLS had on tenant attitudes, these
landlords told me, that removed any remaining cooperative
elements within their relationships.
What seemed most threatening to preserving tenure, dual-pur-
pose landlords said, was the power tenants gained through GBLS to
be able to delay and sometimes to prevent those evictions which
landlords believed were reasonable. It is this power of theirs,
landlords say, that is driving them out of the business often
more strongly than market forces. "If I can't protect my
affordable housing business from the legal process," John Swimmer
told me, "I don't want to aggravate myself with it. I used to
think the law was reasonable in that as long as I gave tenants a
decent apartment, I could collect my rent through the courts if
necessary. Losing three months rent then was fair. Now we're
talking about a tenant who can stay for 5-8 months or longer
without paying which is too unreasonable." Many landlords echoed
John's statement.
Harry Spence, who took over the Boston Housing Authority in
1980, made this need clear in the public housing world, as he
stated: "Eviction becomes a key to making projects liveable and
that the ability to move cases quickly and effectively through
82
35
the court system is critical." What these landlords state
clearly is that GBLS should play less of an adversarial mode if
GBLS intends to keep them from moving more quickly toward
36
eviction and possibly withdrawing altogether.
Thus, both GBLS and HSP effected a variety of changes in
modes and attitudes among landlords and tenants toward the issue
of tenure. Coupled with the response by landlords and tenants
themselves to the role of the law and the courts, professionals
acted in ways that both widened or contracted the negotiating
space among the parties. The role of the state -- both the
programs it operates and it's regulatory powers -- also induces
changes in this joint tenure balance. I will discuss the effect
of one particular program -- the Chapter 707 Rental Assistance
program -- on the issue of preserving joint tenure.
35. Stated by Spence in Boston Globe article on 2/2/82
36. Moving cases too quickly to eviction may breach the rights
of those tenants, to many. GBLS defends it's right to be able to
prevent any and all of those who qualify for their services, from
being evicted; and they will use whatever legal procedures are
possible in order to do it. They are thus quite critical of the
policy HUD recently adopted, whereby HUD now permits local
housing authorities to be able to waive federal due process
guidelines that necessitate a grievance panel to evict tenants
for drug use or other criminal activity. Although the tenant is
still protected by court due process, GBLS fears that tenants for
whom the evidence of drug use is insubstantial, may be evicted
too easily.
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E. The Role of the Chapter 707 State Rental Assistance Program
The role that the Chapter 707 rental assistance program
plays as intersecting with the landlord/tenant relationship and
the role of the professionals throws an important overlay onto
the issue of preventing homelessness and preserving affordable
housing. Overseen by EOCD, the Chapter 707 Rental Assistance
program is similar in principle to the federal Section 8 program,
and has helped Massachusetts' families at a time when the federal
government has all but halted the expansion of the section 8
program.
In the early 80's when the commonwealth first increased it's
attack on the problem of homelessness and affordable housing, the
state debated if making certificates available to tenants who had
just become homeless would create an incentive to do so. They
decided, though, to give them a try. Many believed that tenants
would do everything within their powers to avoid becoming
homeless, yet they also knew that the effect of this widening gap
might be that the number of 'realistic' options for tenants
without the subsidies would decrease to very few.
This widening income gap, coupled with other 'behavioral and
psychological difficulties' associated with the financial stress
of low income tenants together have reduced much of the negoti-
ating room available between landlords and tenants. Conse-
quently, even when tenants weigh the difficulties of becoming
able to 'qualify legally' as a homeless person and waiting
whatever number of weeks is necessary -- either with a relative
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or at a hotel or shelter -- before getting one, many have opted
to get the subsidy having little other choice.
"We now have this system of perverse incentives," says Irene
Lee, Homelessness Coordinator for EOHS. As a result, state
rental subsidies for the homeless have increased from $750,000 in
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FY '86 to $10 million in FY '87 to $40 million in 'FY 88.
A consensus has thus formed that the state is not managing
the problem well enough by giving "the homeless" as high a
priority over them as they've been granted previously. In fact,
the state, for both fiscal and policy reasons, may likely be
reducing it's number of available certificates by as many as 2000
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in FY '90 (a cut of $8.5 million). Although part of their reason
is due to fiscal constraints, more and more people have become
convinced that placing too few conditions for obtaining and
retaining these certificates has led too many to become dependent
on them, which is not the ultimate goal of the program. Their
proposed strategy includes to tighten up the eligibility require-
ments as well as to shift more of these certificates to the
"at-risk" population to prevent them from becoming homeless.
One GBLS attorney responds to this issue by stating that
"low income tenants cannot survive in the private housing market
without a subsidy." Even when tenants cannot secure one, GBLS
will still defend them in order to delay eviction as long as
possible if not to prevent it altogether. This income gap, as
37. Data pulled from Boston Globe article of 2/21/89 entitled:
Rent Subsidies Planned for Families at Risk).
38. These figures were reported in a preliminary statement by the
(State) House of Representatives in April, 1989
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exacerbated by the absence of a certificate, becomes so great
that the negotiating room may not be able to be widened unless
very creative and intensive means are explored to generate new
strategies to increase it. If GBLS does persist in these cases
without building any confidence on the landlords' part, and is
successful in delaying the eviction at a significant cost to the
landlord, however, this raises one of the fundamental questions
around which this thesis is organized.
Should we save the tenant even if it means losing the
landlord? If the likely result of not saving the tenant is that
he or she literally becomes homeless, ('on-the-street'), this
question assumes a more moral dimension. If this tenant instead
choose to enter the state's shelter/hotel/motel system and begins
to access particular services earmarked for the homeless --
housing search, job search, counseling etc. -- in order even-
tually to restabilize and relocate back into private housing, the
question becomes more 'manageable' both politically and ethi-
cally.
Because HSP espouses a dual agenda of protecting the
interests of both landlords and tenants, it cannot adopt such a
(GBLS) strategy -- to saveAthe tenant -- because this o' ' ie;drive
the landlords away. When HSP attempts to preserve joint tenure
relying only to a limited degree on any subsidies, the number of
cases in which they can find any negotiating room becomes much
more narrow. I am arguing in this thesis about what a better
system for preserving joint tenure 'without a subsidy' would look
like -- which will quite likely be the case in the -future.
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Although HSP counselors have known until recently that they
could be reasonably successful in securing a 707 voucher, they
have been cautioned quite strongly by their state supervisor to
avoid doing so (unless 'absolutely necessary'). Although HSP
headquarters "breathes down our [offices'] necks to not tell
people that they can make themselves homeless in order to get
subsidies," Helena says, Tri-CAP [and other HSP agencies] face
the growing challenge of how to increase the negotiating room
without using subsidies. What landlords imply is that increasing
the monitoring activities and expanding it to include stabiliza-
tion services will widen their negotiating room by increasing
their confidence in the tenant's ability to adhere to agreements.
This challenge, however, is formidable.
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PART III: TOWARD AN IMPROVED SYSTEM FOR PRESERVING JOINT TENURE
CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
A. Discussion of Key Findings about the Balance of Power between
Landlords and Tenants, the Characteristics of their Inter-
ractions and their Response to Instability
Although Massachusetts has stepped up its production of
affordable housing throughout the '80's, the gap between the
overall supply of affordable housing and the number of low-income
families has continued to increase. The combination of a rapidly
rising housing market and declining tenant incomes has exacer-
bated this by increasing this difference between what landlords
are charging and what tenants can afford. In their drive to
maximize profits, an increasing number of landlords have procee-
ded to upgrade and to 'condo-convert' such that either they or
their buyers become forced to evict low income tenants.
Traditionally, most agree, landlords have been able to
coerce tenants fairly freely because they had the power to evict;
and, they have been able to evict fairly easily. The laws and
regulations have changed in recent years, however, to signifi-
cantly increase the legal protections for tenants; and legal
service organizations have appeared on the scene to invoke them
against landlords. When landlords begin their eviction procee-
dings, for example, they can most definitely, according to
inspectional departments, be cited for some violation; they will
also be quite likely to make mistakes in proceeding when they
attempt to evict. Both of these may deter landlords signifi-
cantly from succeeding. Many more thus agree now that:
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1. The tenants' powers to protect their interests has become
more equalized in recent years.
Landlords still intimidate and exercise power unfairly
because they have the power to evict and they will continue to do
so. Unregistered small landlords still control a sizable
proportion of the housing stock in Boston, says Jack Hally and
little is known about the private methods with which these
landlords and tenants address the issue of eviction. This is a
significant problem that threatens the needs and interests of
dual-purpose tenants in fundamental ways.
The negative conseqences for landlords if they resort to
offensive tactics, however, have become more equal to those of
the tenant. If landlords 'threaten or coerce' too much, this may
likely drive tenants to their legal defenses and produce the
opposite effects than what the landlords had intended. When Mary
Bishop's landlord told her repeatedly that she must leave because
she was a nuisance -- he told her he had police reports that
indicated she had been drinking excessively -- Mary sought out
legal assistance, invalidated the police reports and won her case
against him. Because of the threat GBLS levies over landlords
furthermore, many say they are deterred from taking advantage of
their tenants.
The unreasonable costs many landlords incurred when they did
succeed in evicting tenants testify to their weakened positions.
Pam Brinner's expenses were over $20,000 in lost rent, damages,
compensation and legal fees; Len Simons' was close to $10,000,
and John Swimmers' was over $5000.
The nuclear warfaring doctrine called MAD (Mutual Assured
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Destruction) provides a useful analogy. Because the US and USSR
are at rough parity in nuclear capabilities, each recognizes if
it attempts to destroy the other that it will be sufficiently
destroyed in response, which limits the power of their threats.
When the power that landlords and tenants wield becomes more
equalized, both sides are limited in using offensive tactics.
They both must negotiate more and use the relationship and it's
interdependency more to their mutual advantage.
2. Inherent within the relationships between landlords and
tenants are stabilizing forces.
Most all landlords will not proceed immediately to evict
tenants the minute they miss a rent payment nor will tenants cite
landlords when they first neglect maintenance. Rather, parti-
cular factors serve to maintain interdependency within their
relationship. Some of these factors are:
a. The costs in money, time and aggravation to landlords if
they have to win a judicial decision in order to evict tenants
induces them to try harder, at first, to stabilize their tenants
when problems crop up. Landlords typically referred to court as
a "last resort" which they would use only if there were no other
options.
b. Landlords recognize that the costs in loss of rent,
advertising and personal hours expended to re-lease their rental
units once they are vacated are high enough that they may work
harder to keep existing tenants in them in order to avoid these
costs.
c. Because of the tight housing market in Boston, there are
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very few affordable options for tenants if they are evicted.
Once tenants recognize this, they may increase their efforts in
their existing tenancy to meet their obligations as a tenant.
d. Both landlords and tenants typically 'do things' for the
other's benefit as part of their relationship (similar to how
people interact in other relationships). Tenants will fix
things, garden or simply respect the privacy of their landlords,
while landlords will offer them work on the property, etc. The
result is that parties build mutual trust in each other, and will
be more tolerant if the relationship breaks down temporarily.
Once the relationships between landlords and tenants become
'unstable', what may they do themselves to preserve their joint
tenure before eviction becomes a certain prospect?
3. When relationships become unstable, there exists 'negoti-
ating room' -- neither will become inflexible immediately --
within which landlords and tenants may extend themselves in
order to preserve joint tenure.
Landlords and tenants will both not escalate their defenses
provided that the other 'reciprocates' to a reasonable degree.
Under conditions of reciprocity, they will each 'extend' them-
selves. For example:
a. Landlords will serve notice not in order to evict, but to
call more serious attention to their requirements. They recog-
nize that tight financial conditions restrict tenants from paying
but they want tenants to make 'paying rent' as much of a spending
priority as possible. Landlords say they do this often intending
to preserve negotiating room -- to forgo eviction -- under
conditions in which tenants will begin to make a greater effort
to get out of arrears.
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b. Under GBLS guidance typically, tenants may be willing
sometimes to forgo forcing landlords to repair all code viola-
tions when it may drive that landlord out of business. Jay Rose,
a GBLS attorney discussed using this type of strategy with
landlords who faced financial constraints but still wanted to
house low income tenants.
c. Landlords will be flexible to provide time for tenants to
restabilize based on their ability to reciprocate and be accoun-
table. They base this on:
i. The tenants' circumstances; When tenants face
circumstances additional to those which make them miss
rent -- problems with their health, marriages or
children, etc. -- landlords will often extend them-
selves while they monitor the tenant's progress.
ii. The tenant's responsiveness to their situations;
Landlords told me they would be more flexible when
tenants were more: upfront and honest, adherent to
interim agreements and motivated -- more 'accountable'
The more that landlords trusted that tenants would and
could respond to their situations, the more they
extended themselves.
Both landlords and tenants may widen or contract this
negotiating space according to the degree to which these condi-
tions of reciprocity and accountability are met.
4. Landlords and tenants are better able and generally more
willing to negotiate and to be flexible when they're
well-defended legally.
Because most eviction disputes between landlords and tenants
don't make it before the judge, much of their dispute resolution
activities happen privately. Both the law and it's role within
the courts provide a frame around their private disputing process
such that the outcome the law would impose gives each party
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certain "bargaining chips." Landlords and tenants will be more
able to use these chips in order to be flexible and to preserve
joint tenure when they are better educated about their legal
rights and how best to apply them.
If landlords didn't know the law or how to follow it, a
tenant could reverse their progress toward eviction by invoking
the law in response. Particularly through the help of GBLS,
tenants, like the ones with whom I spoke delay landlords in their
eviction proceedings and in some cases stop the eviction altoge-
ther. Landlords expressed frustration that even if they did
follow the law, furthermore, they would still get caught with
something they hadn't done correctly, which would impede their
progress.
Although most every tenant with whom I spoke had been
educated to some degree, as they had all used professional
services, landlords traditionally have more easily been able to
take advantage of tenants who are not educated. Without under-
standing that they can defend themselves legally and how to do
it, tenants will be more easily intimidated by landlords who
threaten or actually carry through to evict.
When dual-purpose landlords or dual-purpose tenants are
educated about the law, however, they are more likely to be able
to be flexible and to preserve joint tenure. Dispute resolution
professionals with whom I spoke reminded me that they regularly
counsel parties about the value of knowing what their rights are
and how to invoke them in order to improve their bargaining
powers and to increase the negotiating room.
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When problem-causing landlords and tenants understand the
law and how to apply it, however, they may and do use it to take
advantage of the other party. Landlords, for example, will take
advantage of tenancy-at-will agreements to evict long-standing
tenants -- who have been very responsible as tenants -- with as
little as one months notice. (Although this is legal, it may not
be reasonable). Although I found that most people believed that
understanding the law correlated with increasing the negotiating
room, the attitudes of landlords and tenants clearly play a major
role. Problem-causing tenants and landlords will inevitably use
whatever they know to protect their interests only.
It is when eviction becomes a 'certain' prospect that
professionals and other outside dispute resolvers generally
become involved. Although many advocate that neutrals -- volun-
teer mediators, neighbors, ministers, others -- should intervene
as early as possible to prevent the parties from escalating the
dispute, people generally don't confront conflict until it
escalates, as the literature confirms. We are challenged by the
need to promote the value of addressing conflict early in order
to manage it more effectively.
B. Discussion of Key Findings about the Role of the Professionals
I set forth in this thesis to test my belief that particular
aspects of the current service delivery system offered by GBLS
and HSP not only didn't improve the conditions for joint tenure
but in some cases impaired them. One belief which -I tested was
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that often when GBLS worked to defend tenants only against dual-
purpose landlords, they could 'win the battle' in some measurable
ways -- delay the eviction, earn compensation -- but 'lose the
war' by driving these landlords to leave, convincing other
landlords to do likewise, and oftentimes being unable to prevent
the eviction anyway. Although I recognized that GBLS did state
as one of it's priorities the need "to preserve decent, safe and
affordable housing" ('88 GBLS Housing Unit Plan) and was doing
that very successfully by protecting tenants against problem--
causing landlords, I believed that some of their practices
threatened their ability to meet these needs in the name of
trying to meet them.
As I conducted my research, I began to hypothesize about
what an improved system might look like. I also speculated as to
which type of clients GBLS and HSP should serve and how they
should serve them in order to preserve joint tenure. I set
forth the following matrix that shows when and how I believe that
HSP and GBLS should be involved in order to preserve joint
tenure.
dual-purp. prob-causing dual-purp prob-causing
landlords landlords tenants tenants
Greater Boston play play |play HSP
Legal Services IHSP role I Yes IHSP role' role I
I I I I I
Housing Services |should do'
Program Yes conditional Yes |more mo- I
** initoring
** - HSP should be involved here only when they can balance the
power between landlords and tenants and can provide a non-coer-
cive atmosphere of negotiation. HSP must be able to protect
tenants if landlords try to manipulate the process to achieve
their own interests only.
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What I found is taking place between landlords and tenants
as a result of the involvement of GBLS and HSP generally con-
firmed what I had initially believed. That is, there are both
effective and ineffective aspects of each professional approach
toward preserving the conditions of joint tenure. I will
illustrate these here by discussing the impact of GBLS and HSP on
the conditions of joint tenure between landlords and tenants.
i. The impact of GBLS on the conditions for preserving
joint tenure
It is obvious to the commonwealth that it's rising housing
market has enabled a growing number of landlords to be able to
profit greatly by converting and upgrading their units, which has
displaced many low income tenants. Although problem-causing
landlords engage in this activity more readily, the rising market
induces many dual purpose landlords to shift to profit-only
activities because high profits are available. GBLS, state
regulators and non-profit groups all combined have been able to
help only a modest proportion of these tenants to be able to stay
housed at affordable rates.
1. GBLS protects tenants against problem-causing landlords
and causes problem-causing landlords to act in dual-purpose
mode
What I confirmed is that GBLS plays a critical role in
preventing problem-causing landlords from succeeding. Sometimes
problem-causing landlords would shift into dual-purpose mode
indefinitely whereas others were stopped only temporarily. GBLS
did this both by protecting tenants on a case-by-case basis and
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by deterring other problem-causing landlords who were considering
similar actions.
Many landlords claimed that as a result of (or in fear of)
GBLS, they now meet their legal obligations to their tenants and
act more 'reasonably' toward them. I understand how GBLS does
this mostly only by hearing landlords reflect on the impacts that
GBLS is having on problem-causing landlords in general. I did
not learn this empirically because I was able to research case of
dual-purpose landlords only. The research I did do led me to
uncover many more examples of how dual-purpose landlords turned
into problem-becoming ones in order to protect themselves against
tenants -- who they believe turned against them much because of
the efforts of GBLS. There are more problem-causing landlords
against whom tenants need GBLS for protection than there are dual
purpose landlords who we must protect from GBLS, however.
I did not learn much, thus, about how dual-purpose tenants
turned into problem-becoming tenants through their own and GBLSs'
initiatives. I provide an illustration, here, though. Joan
Bennis' landlord filed a notice to increase her rent by approxi-
mately 75%. This proposed increase was both unreasonably high as
a one-step increase and also illegal because EOCD regulated her
landlord's rent increases. (Her landlord received a financing
package from EOCD in exchange for maintaining affordable rates).
Her landlord's behavior caused Joan to shift into
problem-becoming mode. She began to learn about the power
landlords may wield if tenants don't defend themselves. She soon
sought out GBLS to defend her case and she won easily.
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Because I encountered so few examples like this, I am
limited in being able to discuss the responses of tenants to
problem-causing landlords that accompanied their shift into
problem-becoming mode. Not studying this important area repre-
sents a lack in the completeness of this study. Uncovering more
examples such as Joans' would have helped me to increase my
understanding of the culture of tenants -- in particular, how
they learn on their own when faced with unreasonable threats --
and how GBLS protects them.
2. The effect of GBLS has been to turn many dual-purpose
landlords into problem-becoming landlords -- toward choosing
to make their units become 'unaffordable' and to vindicate
themselves
What dual-purpose landlords say is that GBLS is preventing
them from protecting their abilities to remain in dual-purpose
mode, which is counterproductive to GBLS's espoused goal of "pre-
serving affordable housing." They claim that a result of GBLS's
activities is to drive them toward choosing to make their units
unaffordable either by selling for conversion or by upgrading
themselves. They cite two ways in which this GBLS activity is
happening.
1. When the effect of GBLS is to drive tenants into
problem-becoming mode at the stage where landlords are still
committed to keeping the tenant and to being flexible, these
landlords reverse themselves and turn strongly against their
tenants. They evaporate any and all remaining negotiating room
and proceed most quickly toward eviction.
These landlords described one scenario that occurs; they are
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at the stage where they still have confidence that, if efforts
like those of HSP occur -- which help tenants to reciprocate or
to become and remain stable -- they can preserve joint tenure.
At this stage, what they say they resent most is when tenants,
after collaborating with GBLS, radically shift their strategies
to reduce their cooperation and 4 become both highly defensive and
highly offensive. As a variety of professionals and landlords
report, these tenants will, with the help of GBLS, seek out every
possible way in which to cripple their landlords' credibilities
-- including to 'throw the book at them' for any illegal activity
they discover landlords are committing -- in order to maximize
their gains only. In response, these landlords say, they feel
doubly betrayed -- both because they had been stretching them-
selves, they believed, in order to be flexible, and because the
tenant's response to their stretching was to turn against them.
2. When the objective of GBLS becomes to delay or even to
prevent evictions primarily in order to keep particular tenants
from having to leave, dual-purpose landlords believe they cannot
stay in the business any longer. (These landlords are referring
to those tenants who clearly are problems -- they resist making
any agreements, resist paying rent, and intimidate their land-
lords if they try to invoke the law). As Dick Bauer states: "If
they [the tenants] are able to hang in there [stay housed] long
enough to be able to get a job, to get their kid in daycare...
the longer that tenant can hang on, the better prospects there
are that something will happen to help the tenant... and some-
times it doesn't happen and the tenant ultimately ends up
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becoming homeless anyway." If this works such that the tenant
becomes able to stabilize without it taxing these landlords
excessively, then GBLS is doing their job well.
Against those tenants who, before they are evicted, 'hang
on' and 'ultimately become homeless anyway', however, landlords
go through an ordeal to them that they say is extremely unfair.
One ordeal they described was the toll on their emotions and
their physical health. "My mother [the landlord] had to turn the
property over to us, she went into such a state of depression
because of all this," said Pam Brinner. Ellen Heckler "had a
miscarriage and hemorrhage right after she [the tenant] had a
party from all the tensions."
The other ordeal is what occurred as a result of what they
say are unethical practices on GBLS's part. As Pam Brinner told
me, her tenants "made wild allegations through the help of GBLS
that ended up delaying me for months. The GBLS attorney cited
that the roof leaked but it didn't... that the bathroom drain was
defective but it worked fine, all delaying the process." As Pam
continued, "He [GBLS attorney] told my tenants that they don't
have to pay rent because their landlord can afford to pay for
them." Because GBLS has enabled tenants like Pams' to avoid
paying the rent for many months or to repair damages let alone
the cost to their health, these landlords are both losing their
motivation to provide affordable housing and are becoming
vindictive in response.
I base my argument that these efforts of GBLS are, to a
certain degree, counterproductive to their goal of-"preserving
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affordable housing" by looking at some of the responses by
landlords to GBLS's actions. I cite four examples.
1. Landlords are now adopting new screening practices that
increase their standards for accepting new tenants (within MCAD
guidelines). "As a result of this," said James Boulder, "I'm
very critical now about who I will rent to. I'm willing to spend
money to get credit ratings on the tenants."
2. They are upgrading to make their units unaffordable to
low income tenants. Papi Brinner "will do a total upgrading and
then make a higher priced apartment, and I'll make it unaffor-
dable," she told me. "And my decision to do this is a direct
result of this (GBLS) experience."
3. They are seeking to change the laws such as; to quicken
the eviction process and to make GBLS attorneys personally liable
for having generated false paperwork that delayed the process so
long -- among others.
4. They are forewarning prospective landlords about the
dangers of renting to tenants who qualify for GBLS services.
"Anyone who has worked in troubled central city public
housing developments knows that the first plea of the tenant
leaders is that the means be found to get rid of the problem
families," said Langley Keyes (piece entitled: "Problem tenants
in Public Housing). When Harry Spence took over the Boston
Housing Authority in 1980, he advocated that the legal service
attorneys and other advocates be neutralized (if not won over)...
so as not to bog the authority down. If GBLS prevents not these
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tenant leaders but dual-purpose landlords instead from being able
to evict those problem-causing tenants -- who end up becoming
homeless anyway -- without it taking many months and exorbitant
amounts of money and aggravation, then many of these landlords
will not continue to rent to low income tenants and may get out
of the affordable housing business altogether. For their protec-
tion, they urge GBLS either to avoid these cases altogether or to
play more of an HSP role.
According to policy and their job descriptions, GBLS says
they cannot make any determination of who 'not to fully repre-
sent'. Although questioning 'who is a "problem" and 'will speedy
evictions breach rights' is important, not tackling these issues
is leading to results that are quite counterproductive towards
preventing homelessness and preserving affordable housing.
ii. The impact of the Housing Service Program on the
conditions for Preserving Joint Tenure
As the HSP brochure states. "The HSP offers an inexpensive,
effective way of assisting low-income tenants and homeowners to
remain in their existing housing." Clearly, the nature of the
HSP process is to seek those conditions in which the conditions
of joint tenure are maximized. Their strategies include -- to
seek ways to increase the negotiating space between landlords and
tenants, to help the parties to create agreements that will
rebuild each party's confidence in and commitment to the other --
which are both necessary in order for their relationship to
become and remain stable.
Much more than does GBLS do this, however, HSP 'reality-
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tests' to discover if the gaps -- between what landlords are
charging and what tenants can afford, and between how one party
is behaving and what the other party is requiring of him by law
and reason -- are bridgeable. If HSP determines that the
landlords' claims for rent increases or behavioral changes on the
tenant's part are 'unreasonable', they may refer the tenants to
GBLS if they believe they can't protect the tenant themselves.
HSP also takes these cases on themselves -- intending to
balance the power -- in order to meet the interests of both
parties. If HSP's mediators or counselors are not skillful
enough to protect tenants when landlords act coercively -- when a
landlord, for example, hides his own misdeeds yet tries to
convince a tenant that she will have to and thus should leave --
HSP risks achieving a worse outcome for the tenant than what the
tenant might achieve by using GBLS. (In that example, GBLS could
balance the power more easily). It is for these reasons that I
am arguing that HSP should handle those cases on the condition
that their staff is trained well enough to balance the power and
to provide a non-coercive atmosphere for negotiation.
When HSP determines that the claims of the parties are
reasonable', however, they face the possibility that they cannot
protect a tenant from having to leave unless she can meet the
'reasonable' requirements of her landlord. Assuming they cannot
depend on 707 subsidies, what HSP seeks is to increase the
negotiating room and to build one party's confidence in the other
in whatever ways are possible.
Although HSP works toward achieving joint tenure if at all
103
possible, they try also, if one party must leave (typically the
tenant), to keep that tenant from becoming homeless. Of the 40
mediations Tri-CAP held last year in which an agreement was
reached, the tenant agreed to leave in twenty (20) of them. Many
were confident, however, that they would not become homeless,
which may mean, however, that they will crowd in illegally on
their relatives or live in other conditions that are substandard.
Because Tri-CAP is quite limited to know what actually did happen
both in the short and the long term with these cases -- let alone
for the 750 clients who called in for services in '88 -- it is
difficult to know how well HSP is preserving joint tenure.
There are three ways in which HSP is successful in increa-
sing the negotiating room between landlords and tenants in order
to preserve joint tenure; in one, however, they are limited.
1. HSP enhances those factors that naturally incline
landlords and tenants to become more interdependent with
each other.
Two factors which they enhance are:
i. To open up communication in order to increase one
party's understanding of and appreciation for the
other party's situation.
When Renee Coles learned that her tenant had changed jobs
recently, which caused her to fall behind on the rent, she became
willing to negotiate a repayment plan. "Often the landlord
didn't even know the reasons why the tenant wasn't paying the
rent," a landlord counselor told me. "When that information is
shared," she continued, "Landlords would often become much more
flexible and willing to negotiate." "What's different about
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mediation," Renee told me, "is that someone is in there listening
and understanding that helped us become cooperative." Frank
Kessler decided to use Tri-CAP again because he had "dealt with
unbelievably cooperative people."
ii. For HSP themselves to build relationships with
their clients to induce them to become more flexible in
the future.
Tri-CAP's landlord counselor discussed the value of building
relationships with landlords in particular in order to increase
their willingness to negotiate and to be flexible in the future.
"When I build the landlord's confidence in our ability to
recognize and meet their interests right from the start," Carol
Burner told me, "they will be more likely to call us much sooner
the next time and to try mediation rather than simply to say
unwaveringly that they want that tenant out."
When these two factors are enhanced, the parties will then
be relying more on the stabilizing forces that are inherent to
their relationship.
2. HSP can widen the range of issues to include ones that
are more possible on which to negotiate agreement -- which
may increase the negotiating room on the other issues
When landlords believe they cannot resolve behavioral issues
themselves, they've used their freedom to raise the rent in order
to force an eviction rather than to seek help to resolve them.
By raising the rent beyond the tenants' means, landlords could
evict more easily than by winning on other grounds like nuisance
or suspected drug use, according to a variety of dispute resolu-
tion professionals. When HSP staff surfaced and became able to
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resolve a behavioral issue, for example -- the tenant agrees to
be quiet himself and to keep his stereo down after 11 PM -- this
enabled the parties to begin to achieve success in actually
creating agreements.
By discovering a range of behavioral issues like noise,
garbage, pets, etc. which were quite important to the landlord,
thus, the parties said that they found areas on which they could
negotiate, the resolutions of which could help parties to build
momentum to resolve the rent issues and others. And if the
parties couldn't resolve these new issues, it would clarify that
the tenancy was doomed.
3. HSP provided a formality that could increase the accoun-
tability of landlords and tenants beyond what they could
achieve privately
One example of a formality is the practice HSP makes of
using 'active listening', (an activity where counselor draws out
the client through validating and clarifying questions). "It's
critical that we use counseling skills to get at the emotional
issues which are always a significant part of the dispute," said
Grace McKinnon, "because parties are often not very clear and
need to separate out the issues." Mediators adapted these skills
to induce parties themselves to listen better to each other. In
general, the formality HSP provided was to provide a process in
which the parties would push themselves beyond what they do
privately to find agreements. As landlords told me, the mediator
had more power than they did to motivate parties to adhere to
agreements. To Frank Kessler, "this process put a-jolt, a
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formality into our agreement." With the mediator reminding them
(the tenants) that they can be evicted if they don't pay, I think
they took this process much more seriously. They realized what
the consequences were." The landlords who went through medi-
ation commented that the mediator's role was a critical one in
building some confidence that their tenants would become
accountable, which allowed these landlords to become more
flexible.
4. HSP was limited in helping landlords to build confidence
in their tenant's ability to adhere to agreements because
HSP did very limited follow up.
What HSP is limited to, I inferred from the landlord's
comments, is to sustain each party's willingess and ability to
remain accountable to their agreements over time. Because HSP
generally cannot do much monitoring, parties can build only
limited confidence in the power of their mediation and counseling
practices to institutionalize necessary changes. I will discuss
one strategy for how HSP might improve on this as a recommen-
dation.
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CHAPTER 7: MATCHING THE FRAMES OF THE PROFESSIONALS WITH THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LANDLORDS AND TENANTS
I have presented the conditions that occur when eviction is
a certain prospect. Both the landlord's and tenant's knowledge
of the law and their enactment of it -- how they negotiate and
interact within it's 'shadow' -- play a major role in effecting
the outcome of their disputes. When professionals become
involved with their different frames, as I found, they quite
often effected a 'shift' in each party's mode.
From facing GBLS, I found, problem-causing landlords may
'shift' into dual-purpose mode. They might withdraw from
neglecting their units or from evicting tenants temporarily; and
withdraw indefinitely so long as the tenant resumed and main-
tained conditions of reciprocity -- that they paid the rent and
did not cause disruptions. GBLS hopes the threat it holds over
landlords will deter them from further problem-causing behavior.
From facing GBLS, I also found, dual-purpose landlords
shifted into problem-becoming mode because they believed GBLS
disrespected their needs and interests as they defended their
clients. Landlords shifted also, they said, because they
believed the collaborative efforts of GBLS and the tenants
allowed for their tenants' problem-causing behavior to be
legitimate or for tenants to turn into problem-becoming mode.
In response, they say they will make things more difficult for
the population of low income tenants who qualify for GBLS's
services. They may do credit checks before leasing, learn about
their previous GBLS involvement, if necessary, upgrade or sell --
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in self defense.
From facing HSP, on the other hand, I did not find any
landlords who shifted from problem-causing to dual-purpose mode
mostly because many of these problem-causing landlords don't want
to negotiate with tenants and will avoid using HSP. I believe
this type of shift does not occur as a rule.
I have also found that embedded within the culture of the
relationship between landlords and tenants is some amount of
negotiating room that gets widened or contracted by how they
address the issue of eviction. Landlords don't just evict
tenants the minute they stop paying rent nor do tenants immedi-
ately cite landlords once they neglect maintenance. Rather, they
both take 'steps' of threats and counterthreats, cooperative ges-
tures, promises and agreements, as they try to preserve joint
tenure up to a point -- afterwhich one party or both will
inevitably have to leave.
My research indicates that the response by landlords and
tenants to many factors -- the role of the state, law, courts,
professionals and others -- serves either to widen or contract
the negotiating room when they encounter instability in their
relationship. When the frames of the two professional organi-
zations which I have studied -- the legal-negotiation (GBLS)
frame and the counseling-negotiation-mediation (HSP) frame --
'match' this relationship, each will serve either to widen or
contract their negotiating room, and hence the conditions for
preserving joint tenure.
Factors that 'widen' the negotiating room for-landlords and
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tenants include:
- Both the landlord and tenant are educated about the law
and negotiation and they understand their bargaining
positions, yet they recognize the mutual benefit to explo-
ring common ground before falling back onto them.
- When instability first occurs, parties proactively
address problem intending to preserve joint tenure, knowing
that if they avoid the conflict, it may eventually escalate
until it inevitably costs at least one party it's tenure or
both.
Factors that 'contract' this negotiating room include:
- A landlord who does not understand the law or how best to
apply it notifies his tenant informally and by word-ofmouth
that unless she becomes more regular in paying rent, she'll
have to leave. Instead of responding by both investigating
the landlord's legal status and addressing the issue of
paying rent, the tenant instead tells the landlord only
that if he 'tries' to evict her, she'll have the inspector
cite him and that she has begun to investigate if he
is violating codes or other legal requirements. The
landlord then decides that he must evict the tenant imme-
diately. The tenant then adopts a full legal defense
strategy and the landlord becomes most inflexible in
response.
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1. The matching process with the legal-negotiation (GBLS) frame
i. An example of a match between the legal-negotiation
frame and the landlord/tenant relationship that contracted
the negotiating room
Consider a tenant (Linda) who goes to GBLS when her landlord
first serves notice. Although her relationship with him is still
good, she assumed he would not negotiate any further no matter
what she did. After consulting with GBLS, Linda decided first to
investigate his legal status. Rather than to seek a way to
protect her interests in such a way that her landlord might 'buy
in', she quickly assumes her landlord's worst motivations
instead; she uses GBLS to escalate 'her defenses' against
eviction, intending to maximize her gains only.
Len now assumes Linda's worst motivations, escalates his
defenses, loses any interest in Linda's welfare, and proceeds
most efficiently towards eviction. Linda does leave eventually,
free from most rent arrearages.
The mismatch occurred because of the way GBLS assisted, said
the landlord. He said afterwards that he would have still worked
out an agreement if she hadn't "changed face" so radically --
evaded his needs and fought to maximize hers only. Because
GBLS defined the problem as 'deterring lawlessness' and 'pre-
venting [tenant] displacement' only, without considering how to
help the landlord also to protect his interests, the landlord
reduced the flexibility he still had, which might have enabled
them to preserve joint tenure. He now does not want to rent
again to low income tenants. Although GBLS may have satisfied
it's short-term criteria of delaying the eviction and maximizing
ill
financial compensation for the tenant, it caused the landlord to
reframe' his situation too quickly.
ii. An example of a match between the legal-negotiation
frame and the relationship between landlords and tenants
that widened the negotiation space
Mike and Martha Fisk are the tenants for Frank Kessler, who
eventually called Tri-CAP to help him resolve the financial and
domestic issues separating the parties. As Mike told me, "we've
been behind with the rent a lot since last summer." In October
when the Fisks had fallen three months behind, the parties
resolved the matter through Emergency Assistance funds, but the
Fisks fell behind again in December. Although Mike attributed
this to his financial woes, (I'm in and out of work as an
apprentice plumber making only $7/hour), to Frank, "the issue was
their lack of desire to pay rent." Frank felt "the real problem
was getting them to become serious about paying this rent money."
Regarding domestic matters, Mike had agreed to do some
painting and mechanical chores, but, as he told me, "didn't get
around to them," which made Frank get very upset with him. Frank
had previously made arrangements for Mike to do this in lieu of
rent, which never happened. Frank would threaten to serve
notice, periodically, but the Fisks did not make any changes in
response.
Although Frank did not want to evict -- "it would take a
long time to win in court and cost a lot of money" -- he was
feeling increasingly that he did not have any choice but to
evict.
In this case, (like many I discovered), Kessler hoped he
wouldn't have to evict unless absolutely necessary but he
wouldn't extend himself any further toward the tenant. An
example of the legal-negotiation frame whose match widened the
negotiation space goes as follows.
Mike learned what his legal rights are -- that he could hold
Kessler accountable for any and all code violations and other
legal obligations and force him to comply with them before
Kessler could advance his case for eviction. Mike knew that
there were at least some minor code violations.
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Mike needed to stay and knew what Frank's legal obligations
were. Frank needed Mike to resume paying the rent and to
complete the housework as agreed. Mike and his attorney could
negotiate in the 'shadow of the law' to seek an agreement in
which both parties would be satisfied. Regarding the codes,
Frank had stated: "I've fixed things all along and will continue
to do so if Mike becomes more regular in paying the rent."
For Frank not to evict let alone to keep fixing, Mike needed
to show 'good faith' on the rent. From this, Frank could again
trust. "It was a lack of trust," said Josh Jacks, "that very
often breaks down the momentum to find agreements through medi-
ation."
Here, Mike knows the law and acts on it's basis not to
maximize his gains only, but to increase his bargaining power as
a negotiator seeking solutions -- agreeable to Frank but that
protected his tenure. Establishing legal defenses not to defend
himself but, instead, to negotiate towards mutual satisfaction on
Mike's part matched Kesslers' needs.
2. The Matching Process with the Counseling-negotiation-mediation
(HSP) frame
i. An example of a match between the counseling-negotiation-
mediation frame and the relationship between landlords and
tenants that contracted the negotiating space
Consider the case where a tenant (Audrey) has been irregular
in paying her rent now for the past half year. She had first
become increasingly unable to pay until she stopped being able to
pay altogether. She said she had options -- going on public
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assistance, getting family help, etc. -- which she could still
use to reinstate herself. Her landlord (David) has breached
some of his basic obligations as well -- at times he has delayed
in fixing the bathroom for days on end and in providing heat for
short intervals. David neglected these not because of his
financial limitations, but because he is most interested to
maximize profit and to convert his unit as soon as possible.
Over the past two years, he has steadily increased the rent
to levels that are higher than average for similar units, hoping
that Audrey would decide to leave on her own. When the back rent
Audrey owed rose to three months, David decided to serve notice
and to follow through. Because he became afraid of losing
more if he took his case the full legal route, he then suggested
that they go to mediation. He believed, privately, that he would
be better able to induce Audrey to leave more quickly and inex-
pensively through mediation.
Audrey was very quiet when she first met with a counselor.
She expressed interest to do mediation, but was non-descript
about her response to the landlord. On one hand she listed some
ways where she could reinstate the tenancy, but none, to the
counselor, seemed well-formed enough for her to rely on. Her
rent was much higher than what her benefits might cover, and her
family was too poor to be able to help her. The counselor felt
that she was enough in control, seeming quite calm and agreeable
in response to the landlord's requests.
As the mediation session begins, David first lists all the
reasons why Audrey in good conscience must realize -it's appro-
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priate for her now to go -- she can't and won't be able to pay
the rent that he needs to charge to make ends meet -- and
proposes a resolution in which she leaves with terms he hoped she
would believe reflected his generosity. "I'm willing to give you
two months," he tells her; "and I'll forgo collecting but one
month of back rent, and I'll replace the rug and the door that
you damaged as well." When she proposes that he give her another
chance because she may get help, he reels off a series of
incidents where she didn't keep to her word to indicate that he
doesn't trust her and that she shouldn't trust herself.
Audrey had previously learned what her legal rights were.
She had mentioned her concerns about the code violations but had
downplayed their importance "because David's case seemed so
strong." She had agreed to do mediation for reasons that were
unclear to the staff., In her private session with the mediator
after David made his public proposal, the mediator explored
options with her -- to stop the process in order to proceed
legally, to negotiate to stay on the basis of her options to
secure monies coupled with welfare, to consider if the judge
offer a better deal which she could leverage to get David to
improve on his, etc. Because she was intimidated and convinced
that she wouldn't fare better using more defensive tactics, she
resists choosing the option to use more defensive strategies.
(Maybe 'being convinced' helped her to not face 'feeling all the
fears' associated with overcoming her intimidation). "I can
understand his position," she tells her mediator, "and I know
he'll get angry if I stop him at this point."
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Audrey decides to accept David's offer. She later learns
that a tenant who faced a similar situation as hers won a much
better deal when he went before the judge.
Discussion; For the mediator to balance the power in this
instance, he must help Audrey to sort out her options to best
protect her own interests in response to a landlord who is
looking out only for his. Because David has neglected some basic
maintenance responsibilities and has raised the rent without
having legitimate financial reasons, Audrey should employ some
defenses in order to balance the power.
Because the mediator's and counselor's work is primarily to
help clients to 'choose freely' among options, they face the
difficulty of remaining aware to know when it's best and how best
to assume a more advocative stance. In this case, the process
would have worked better if Audrey grew more cautious and
resistant to choosing to do mediation as a result of her coun-
seling session. It's in that session where the counselor may
have better ellicited the underlying issues -- that she was too
afraid to assert herself at all, not able to get needed monies
together, let alone to know where to go if evicted. Given that
Audrey was so intimidated, HSP staff could have done a number of
things better to balance the power.
1. They may have more effectively surfaced from Audrey what
David's own 'breaches' were, how they affected her, and what
compensation she believed she should get in response, all of
which may have helped her to overcome her intimidation.
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2. They could have reality-tested more effectively with
Audrey to:
a. Play out her options for getting monies together to
help her realize these weren't realistic.
b. Help her to realize that she could win more time or
not have to leave altogether if she invoked the law;
which would also have pushed against her fears about
asserting herself.
3. They could have stopped the mediation process altogether
because they weren't able to preserve a balance of power.
Because David is a problem-causing landlord, HSP in this
instance should have proceeded better to have helped Audrey
decide not to compromise as easily and to have been more sug-
gestive that she use GBLS. Although this may press them up
against their values of being non-prescriptive, in cases like
this, it may be a more appropriate response.
An example of a match between the counseling-negotiation-medi-
ation frame and the landlord/tenant relationship that widened the
negotiation space
This landlord (Danny) has been living in conditions under
which he has grown steadily more frustrated. It has been a year
now since he discovered that when his tenant (Cheryl) left her
kitchen garbage out on her porch and in the front hallway in open
paper bags fom which rubbish leaked out, he would soon afterwards
receive an onslaught of rodents and cockroaches who crawled up
into his kitchen. Furthermore, because Cheryl also let her
baby's diapers regularly go loose in the house making a mess that
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leaked into the hallway, Danny became upset as the smells were
too unbearable. He at first acted kindly to Cheryl by gently
requesting that she 'be more careful', and he exterminated both
his unit and hers. These creatures began to reappear regularly,
however, tracked back to her garbage. He exterminated a second
and a third time; at each juncture he acted a bit more authori-
tatively to induce her to 'be more careful'.
Dannys' requests for Cheryl to turn down her stereo after
11 PM and to keep her loud parties under reasonable control also
went unheeded. After the police arrived one night to arrest her
friend for excessive drinking at one of them, Danny requested
that she be more careful, yet this behavior became worse until
one night a man smashed a chair through her top floor window. At
one point as well, Cheryl became irregular in paying her rent.
One month she gave only one half; the next month she made it up
but gave only three quarters more, and so on. Because she never
fell more than one month behind at any one point, Danny reasoned
that this problem was not significant enough on which to begin
the eviction process.
Each time after Danny had come down to talk with Cheryl to
make an agreement in which she would improve her garbage han-
dling, keep the noise level down and generally be more consi-
derate, she did not follow through. In response to his next
visit and request, Cheryl snapped back: "I have rights you know,
so don't you try evicting me because I'll sue you and make it too
difficult." Because the behavior issues had become too signi-
ficant by this point, Danny felt he had no choice but to evict.
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Danny believed he would never be able to win by charging her
on grounds of nuisance. He also felt unable to communicate that
not resolving them was threatening her tenure because he thought
he could never win this legally and she'd begin to threaten him
back in response. Instead, he decided to notify her that he
would be enacting a series of rent increases over a period of
time "because he couldn't afford not to given the costs to
provide housing," as he told her.
In response, Cheryl defiantly refused to pay the rent the
next month, and Danny then served her notice to quit. Cheryl
became quite anxious that she might get evicted. She also
became vindictive and began to research her rights, which made
Danny become anxious in response. Danny then thought it would be
better to go to mediation because he believed they could confront
their issues better.
As the mediation session began, it became quite clear that
this intersection of behavioral and financial issues had esca-
lated the dispute. The mediator learned also that Danny was
hoping he would not have to evict but Danny knew privately that
if he couldn't resolve the behavioral issues, he would raise the
rent and hope she would eventually leave or provide sufficient
grounds for him to become able to win an eviction case. He
needed more confidence than what she had previously provided by
her promises if he was to remain flexible.
In the mediation session, Cheryl realized what was at stake.
She began to 'take seriously' that if she didn't honor the
requests made by her landlord, she could very well -be evicted.
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For Cheryl to be able to respond, HSP believed, she might need to
learn new skills -- mothering skills, managing in the kitchen
etc. -- which they could begin to teach her, although on a
limited basis.
Because Danny and Cheryl became able to structure an
agreement -- in which Cheryl would make specific changes regar-
ding her sanitary and other domestic practises, he became
confident that things could and would improve. Danny also agreed
to not raise the rent for some time until needed, to call her
first before paying visits to her unit, and to agree to an
arrangement where Cheryl could repay the back rent owed over a
period of eight (8) months.
Because Danny was able go only so far as to ask Cheryl to
'be more careful' for fear of her return threats, they could not
address the issues that most seriously threatened tenure.
Dannys' plans to raise the rent were the only way he could call
attention to his needs and maybe to evict if necessary although
he hoped not to have to. It was the counselors' and mediators'
skills at surfacing underlying issues, defig the problem and
facilitating an improved understanding between the parties that
increased the negotiating room; the parties themselves were
clearly not able to constructively confront the main issues
without this.
The process thus worked to enable each party to get what
they wanted. For Cheryl, this meant staying housed and being
treated respectfully when Danny had requests of her. For Danny,
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when the mediator told him that she had expressed that she does
feel bad about his frustrations, wants things to be better and is
willing to make changes -- and, she helped to construct an
agreement to honor this, he regained his confidence.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Conclusion
Despite the Commonwealth's success in increasing the supply
of new affordable housing units, we have witnessed a steady
decrease in the overall affordable housing supply throughout the
'80's. Although tenants' abilities to protect their interests
have become more equalized in recent years due to new statutes
and the rise of organizations like GBLS, a rising housing market
along with declining incomes among low income renters have
widened the income gap, which has dramatically reduced the
negotiating room between landlords and tenants.
To close this income gap, we must help either tenants to
generate more income or landlords to charge less rent, if
possible. Using the 'stabilizing forces' existing within their
relationship -- court as a "last resort," being helpful to build
trust, not alienating the 'nice' landlords 'who care', others --
will also serve to widen it. When it is the landlord's problem-
causing behavior primarily that is increasing this gap, however,
GBLS must defend these tenants and deter other problem-causing
landlords as well. When it is a tenant's family, behavioral,
substance abuse and other problems that is threatening joint
tenure, however, these tenants will need more than to just be
well-defended if they are to be able to restabilize.
The HSP can be successful in uncovering this intersection of
underlying behavioral issues and rent -- which must both be ad-
dressed -- in order to preserve joint tenure. HSP -is currently
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limited, though, to be able to help tenants to become and remain
stable under the new agreements they make in mediation -- which
may significantly increase the negotiating room between landlords
and tenants. If HSP staff combine the activities of two roles --
to be both a caseworker who helps tenants to tie into services;
and a probation officer who monitors tenants' progress, sets
limits, and coordinates with other service providers when
necessary -- into an improved 'stabilization' strategy, they may
significantly increase the landlord's willingness and ability to
extend himself further with tenants.
If it is this intersection of the tenants' financial or
behavioral issues rather than the problem-causing behavior of
landlords that is the primary threat to joint tenure, then
providing full legal representation to these tenants is only a
partial response. Defending only tenants in such a way that
dual-purpose landlords cannot protect their basic interests may
provide tenants with short term relief, but may be likely to
provoke these landlords to -- withdraw any remaining flexibility,
try to evict again as soon as possible, possibly to make their
unit unaffordable, and altogether to leave the tenant in worse
condition than before they 'defended'.
Unless we also protect the interests of these dual-purpose
landlords, we will lose their motivation to continue providing
affordable housing that will result in less affordable housing
and more homelessness. Specifically, GBLS must do some screening
in order to not represent problem tenants and must restrict their
intervention to be descriptive rather than prescriptive when the
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landlord may reduce his flexibility in response.
I present below a series of five (5) sets of conclusions and
recommendations for how to improve the conditions for joint
tenure between landlords and tenants. For many of these recom-
mendations, we will need to secure funding in order to accomplish
them. Rather than to restrict what I am recommending because
funding is so limited, I have chosen instead simply to state most
completely what I think. How to decide from among these
recommendations which ones are the priorities and how to secure
funds both remain as challenges.
B. Recommendations for how to improve the conditions for joint
tenure between landlords and tenants
SERIES #1. GENERAL NEEDS FOR LANDLORDS AND TENANTS TO ENHANCE
JOINT TENURE
Action #1:
HELP THE PARTIES TO MAXIMIZE THE BENEFITS THAT THE
STABILIZING FORCES OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP MAY PROVIDE.
Recommendation
Both HSP and GBLS should increase their educational services
to tenants and landlords for them to learn more about how to
maximize the use of the stabilizing forces that exist. The
knowledge that landlords and tenants should acquire is about the
value that doing trust-building activites may have on preserving
stability. The training would help them learn how to do the
following:
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- The tenant makes more effort to fix things.
- The tenant checks in intermittently with the landlord
to see if he is 'sitting' on any problems that might
escalate if they aren't addressed soon.
- The landlord checks in with tenant in similar
fashion.
- The landlord offers for tenant to do work on property
in exchange for rent when this is possible.
Action #2:
HELP THE PARTIES TO LEARN HOW BEST TO ENHANCE THE NEGOTI-
ATING ROOM BETWEEN LANDLORDS AND TENANTS WHEREVER AND
WHENEVER POSSIBLE
Recommendations:
1. Landlords and tenants must become better educated about
the value of addressing disputes early. Many landlords claim
that they are more willing to be flexible when they can surface
what the underlying issues are and achieve resolutions as soon as
possible. HSP should increase it's educational services to:
a. educate landlords and tenants about the value of
early intervention and
b. encourage them to take part in early intervention.
There is a risk to encouraging this. That is, problem-
causing landlords may use this 'advance knowledge' to move more
effectively toward evicting the tenant. My simple response is
that the power of the HSP-type of counseling process is to work
with the parties in order for them not to use information for
manipulative purposes. This area must be explored further,
though.
2. A clause should be inserted into landlord/tenant leases
that obligates them to attempt mediation/negotiation as a first
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step to resolve disputes.
3. HSP, GBLS and others should educate landlords and tenants
(either as part of their professional interventions or generally)
in the following areas:
- Negotiation skills: Will help them manage their
differences throughout the tenancy and when instability
occurs.
- Legal Rights: When landlords understand their legal
rights, they will more likely be able to extend
themselves, as they know how to defend themselves if
necessary. When tenants understand their legal rights,
they can increase their bargaining power both in
negotiation and in court.
- (For tenants): In a variety of skills (sanitation
practices, parenting, money management, etc). This
will tie into the role HSP plays and their coordination
with the state.
4. HSP and GBLS should help the parties to explore alterna-
tive income generating measures in order to widen the negotiation
space. I am not referring to the more traditional 'house
improvements in exchange for rent' measures that landlords and
tenants already employ. I am referring to a wider range of
in-kind services; babysitting for the landlord's kids, doing his
shopping, raising a garden, or other measures that may be of
tangible help to the landlord.
SERIES #2: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENABLING GREATER BOSTON LEGAL
SERVICES BETTER TO WORK TOWARDS JOINT TENURE OF LANDLORDS AND
TENANTS
Action #1:
RESTRICT THE ROLE OF GBLS IN SUPPORTING "PROBLEM-CAUSING
TENANTS"
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Recommendations:
1. GBLS must inform themselves about who their client is in
order to make a reasonable determination about if he or she is a
problem-causing tenant. They can research the client's court
record, job history, housing history, social service history etc.
To do this, they may call sources who have had contact with them.
I acknowledge that this is a very difficult issue in which to
find a solution given the nature of the legal process. I
encourage GBLS to give some thought to exploring what are the
obstacles to doing such a thing, and what kind of a strategy
might be feasible.
2. When they determine that they do have such a problem-
causing tenant, they should restrict their involvement to an
HSP-type role rather than to exercise full litigation powers.
This should involve only educating tenants about the law but not
representing them or advising them about strategy. This would
resemble HSP quite closely.
Action #2; TO INCREASE ACCESS BY PROBLEM-BECOMING TENANTS
TO GBLS WHEN THEY FACE PROBLEM-CAUSING LANDLORDS
Action #3; GBLS SHOULD PLAY A ROLE SIMILAR TO GBLS WHEN
USING A FULL LEGAL DEFENSE STRATEGY WILL LIKELY CAUSE
DUAL-PURPOSE LANDLORDS TO WITHDRAW THEIR FLEXIBILITIES AND
DECIDE IMMEDIATELY TO EVICT THEIR TENANTS
Recommendations: To determine in advance that GBLS may
cause this to occur, GBLS should:
a. Inform themselves either through first- or secondhand
sources about the landlord's position and on what bases will
they withdraw their commitment to the tenant.
b. Discuss with HSP if their counseling/mediation
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intervention may be more appropriate.
c. Fully inform tenant about their knowledge of predic table
responses by the landlords to their litigation activity.
Action #4: GBLS SHOULD MODIFY IT'S PRO SE KIT IN ORDER FOR
TENANTS TO VIEW IT ALSO AS 'DESCRIPTIVE' AS WELL AS 'PRE-
SCRIPTIVE'
Currently, GBLS's pro se (self-help) kit 'prescribes' what
tenants 'should' do. Their original statement -- "If you [the
tenant] are faced with an eviction,.... to fight it, you need to
have a defense -- avoids making the distinction between when --
a landlord is extending himself but needs some reciprocity; and
when the landlord has drawn the line and sees no option but to
evict. To the extent that the tenant isn't educated to determine
what they could do to preserve their landlord's flexibility
before defending, they will eliminate the possibility of the
landlord 'remaining flexible' earlier than may be best for them.
Therefore, the Pro Se kit should include a discussion that helps
tenants think about other resolution options than invoking the
law in their defense.
SERIES #3: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENABLING HSP BETTER TO WORK
TOWARD JOINT TENURE
Action #1: TO DO ONGOING TRAINING TO ENSURE THAT STAFF
REMAIN TRAINED TO BE ABLE TO PROTECT THE DEFENSES AND RIGHTS
OF BOTH PARTIES AS PART OF THE COUNSELING AND MEDIATION
PROCESS.
Action #2: HSP SHOULD INCREASE AND EXPAND IT'S MONITORING
ROLE TO INCLUDE "STABILIZATION" SERVICES
Mediated agreements often require one or both parties to
make significant changes in their behavior. Tenants may need to
learn how to manage money quite differently in order to make sure
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that they can keep enough aside to be able to pay on the 10th of
each month, for example. Landlords too must learn how to
restrain from barging into their tenants' units each time they
want to show the unit to a prospective renter. If HSP had
monitored agreements beyond making the perfunctory follow up
phone call, landlords commented, this might have further in-
creased their confidence in the process.
If HSP staff were able to follow up not merely to monitor
the agreements but to help to keep tenants stable in order to be
able to adhere to them, I infer from the landlords' comments,
these landlords would have been more willing both to -- first
construct and enter into the agreements, and then to remain
committed to them -- rather than to stay on the alert to run to
their legal defenses at the first negative signal.
Tri-CAP HSP staff acknowledged that they have not been able
to do much follow up with their clients. A counselor told me:
"We have time to do about one phone call a month or two after the
mediation, but beyond that we're just not equipped." This
counselor used to assume that 'no news was good news', as she
told me: "I used to believe that if they didn't call me back
after resolution that things are OK but I know now I can't assume
that." Overall, I believe that if HSP both increased and
expanded it's role within the follow up phase, landlords would be
more willing and able to be flexible and to preserrve negotiating
room in the future.
I present two alternative models. One comes from the
Department of Public Welfare (DPW) where Jeanne Gould works with
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tenants who have most recently been homeless but have just been
placed into housing. The other comes from Quincy's rent grie-
vance board whose director, Jane Reikard, works mostly with
middle income tenants. I will use these two to illustrate how
HSP might increase and expand their activities of follow-up.
Jeanne Gould of DPW's Housing Division:
As a "stabilization specialist" working with DPW's Housing
division, Jeanne helps clients who have recently been homeless to
remain stable in their new housing. Representing both landlords
and tenants, Jeanne mediates or negotiates, when asked by the
parties, to help them to achieve agreements. Like HSP, she will
coordinate with the tenant's public benefits manager; for
example, Jeanne may get the landlord to 'buy in' to the agreement
in exchange for the tenant agreeing to go onto protected pay-
ments.
Yet beyond what HSP is able to do (except on a limited
basis), Jeanne helps to keep tenants stable. Although she does
this with landlords, she works mostly with tenants both to make
sure they have what they need to be able to comply and to monitor
them to make sure they comply.
"When the dispute involves behavioral issues that reflect
skills which the tenant may be lacking," Jeanne told me, "I will
suggest to the tenant: "would you agree to see a counselor,
receive a homemaker to help you learn housekeeping skills or
other type services? Tying these tenants into these services
will enable them to adhere better to their mediation agreements
which will help landlords to sustain their confidence in the
entire process. When tenants need more support, Jeanne may even
join up with DSS homeless stabilization workers to pay regular
visits. "Sometimes the deal I've made with DSS is that they
visit one week (to do counseling) then I visit the next and we'll
go on like this for 3 months." Jeanne thus works quite inten-
sively with the tenants to help them overcome their resistance to
using services. Jeanne thus helps them to become able to manage
themselves and their relationships to landlords.
Her second role is to monitor them closely to make sure that
they comply. When a tenant needs to be pushed, (after the
landlord has called Jeanne to explain why the agreement is not
working), Jeanne will send them registered letters to state
quite clearly the "risks" tenants face if they don't comply. If
the tenant doesn't respond to her second registered letter and
furthermore resists receiving her phone calls or a further visit,
Jeanne may then request that the tenant's public assistance case
manager invite her to her next meeting with the tenant in order
to address the issue with the tenant face-to-face. "I respect
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what the difficulties for you are," she will tell them, but
she'll state the facts about the threat of eviction and offer
more encouragement.
How far can Jeanne 'push' to induce tenants to comply? "I
don't use force," she told me, but "I state the facts and provide
incentives." "Because my low income tenants depend on rent
subsidies, I tell them they have to change their behavior if they
want to keep them, but I can't force this," Jeanne told me.
Jeanne will warn them that it will be very difficult to be able
to get a subsidy re-issued to them if they've been evicted. The
only thing we can cancel their benefits for however, Jeanne told
me, is when they don't report their income or they're not feeding
their children or paying the rent."
"I've dealt with 400 tenants over the last couple years and
I only have a handful I'm still dealing with and I've had only 2
evictions," Jeanne told me.
Jane Reikard of Quincy's Rent Grievance Board;
Whereas Quincy's HSP (A program of Quincy Community Action
Program) works with low income tenants, Jane Reikard works with
middle income along with low income tenants Jane works
primarily on an independent basis with landlords and tenants yet
she uses her board to resolve disputes when necessary.
Most of Jane's work is on the phone. Similar to HSP, she
will educate parties about their rights, help them explore
options and work towards achieving resolutions in which both
landlords and tenants are satisfied. But different than HSP,
Jane will be more of an advocate for each party -- a 'broker' of
agreements. To help a tenant who "can't pay the rent, doesn't
want to leave and has no place to go," Jane tells me, she'll call
the landlord and tell him "this is a mission of mercy. Someone
in my office just can't pay the rent right now, they expect to be
working a month from now, and it will be another week before they
can pay you, what can you do to help me."
Having been at this for 12 years, Jane's earned the respect
of her landlords. Hence they cooperate, she tells me, because
they trust that she knows how to get tenants to comply. "OK Jane
I'll agree to carry them, maybe for three months, and after that
I expect to see some money," Jane tells me they tell her. "I
would never have been able to do anything for the tenants all
these years if I didn't have this cooperation," Jane believes.
So Jane must also work hard with the tenants to make sure
they comply. "I can't help you unless you're willing to coope-
rate with me by doing something to help yourself," Jane tells
them, "because I'm not going to go to the landlord to ask him to
carry them unless there is any promise of something for him down
the line." Hence Jane works closely with her tenants, to make
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most certain they hold to their promises. Jane understands her
limits and will cease helping tenants who don't help themselves.
Different than HSP, though, Jane has built up a cooperative
relationship over many years among Quincy's landlords such that
they will extend further to tenants, trusting her abilities to
get tenants to comply, which she works hard to make happen.
The steps that Reikard and Gould take to be both case
managers and probation officers provide two variations on the
stabilization theme. When their services work well, landlords
gain more faith that tenants will be able to comply with their
agreements, and tenants receive the additional support that is
needed for them to be able to do so.
The HSP worker could also begin to include these 'stabili-
zation' services as part of their job description. She or he
would begin to work with the tenants both as caseworker -- tying
them into services, and as probation officer -- monitoring their
progress. Once an agreement is reached where the tenant must
improve domestic practices, pay the rent on the 10th, keep the
noise down, etc. the HSP worker would work intensively with the
tenant to both tie him into services and monitor him for com-
pliance. The HSP worker could also coordinate between the tenant
and public assistance case managers just as Gould 'coordinates'
with the tenant and his. If this tenant refuses to receive the
worker's assistance, he may meet the worker in the public
assistance office (given that the tenant is on public assis-
tance).
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Action #3 HSP STAFF SHOULD INCLUDE AN ADVOCATIVE COMPONENT
TO PROVIDE A 'CARROT' TO MOTIVATE TENANTS TO INCREASE THEIR
EFFORTS AND ABILITY TO MEET THEIR MEDIATION AGREEMENTS.
The HSP worker may also function more like an advocate
between the tenant and this case manager, I will suggest, which
is a more intensive role than to coordinate. This advocacy role
is based on the concept which the state is considering employing,
called 'mandatory institutional services'. Under this scheme,
the tenant's public benefits will be extended based on a review
of the client's progress in which approval is conditional. If
the tenant has not met baseline expectations of the state,
extensions will be granted in conjunction with the tenant joining
into a mandatory service plan and/or having received a sound
recommendation from the tenant's DSS worker -- who has 'con-
tracted' with the tenant in order to be his advocate for exten-
sions. In exchange, the tenant must meet particular goals
established jointly with his social worker. The DSS worker may
use this power as a 'carrot' to entice the tenant to push herself
harder to start using and benefitting from the self-help skill
39
trainings.
39. A good example of how the state would apply this is in their
procedures for granting extensions for homeless hotel/motel (H/M)
dwellers. Currently, a tenant in the hotels or motels may fairly
easily get an extension of their Emergency Assistance (EA)
benefits to allow them to stay longer than the initial 90 day
period, says Judy Reilly (Assistant Deputy Commissioner of DSS).
Although the conditions within the hotels and motels are rough,
for some it may represent a positive step of independence from
their families and they do get to be housed, albeit substan-
dardly.
Because it is so difficult for the state to be able to get
them out eventually let alone to help them get out of their
poverty and dependency cycles, it is considering turning the
decision about 'extending these benefits' into more of a process
in which the tenant will 'contract' with their DSS -worker in
order to get extensions. For example; if the family, who has
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(Continuation of 39) gotten housing search, has been turned down
for four apartments, then the extension of their benefits will be
coupled with mandatory participation in a service plan that
includes continued housing search. The DSS worker could also
play a mediatory role between the H/M dweller and the state; 'If
you work with me -- services, monitoring etc.' -- the DSS worker
tells the client, I'll vouch for you to get your 90 day period
extended'.
This is a tricky public policy issue. Although some argue
that judiciously applying some of these limits are in the
client's best interests, you run the risk of being criticized for
'dictating what's in their best interests. "Are you putting
people at the beginning of a shoot which they have no ability to
control simply by allowing them to enter the H/M's?" Reilly
questions, "especially if they are pleased, even after having
been homeless for 6 months that they now don't have to fight with
their mother."
Within the HSP domain, we could give the HSP worker this
same power -- to be able to advocate that the tenant get his/her
benefits extended -- as a carrot to entice these tenants to push
themselves harder. In exchange for receiving positive recommen-
dations, tenants will agree, for example, to increase their
participation in self-help services, (which has become necessary
for them to do in order to meet their mediation agreements). The
HSP worker could measure the tenant's compliance here both by
charting his/her progress in increasing his/her participation in
services as well as by monitoring the landlord's changing
confidence level in the tenant.
Action #4: HSP MAY HELP THE PARTIES TO EMPLOY ALTERNATIVE
INCOME-GENERATING MEASURES TO WIDEN THE NEGOTIATING ROOM.
Given that the state will very likely be cutting back signi-
ficantly on the number of Chapter 707 vouchers issued in FY '90,
HSP workers will be able to use them to preserve joint tenure on
even fewer occasions than currently. As a result, a much larger
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number of these tenants will face 'unbridgeable' income gaps --
unless the tenant can significantly increase his income, or be
able to resolve other very intractable issues -- in order to
offset the income gap.
It becomes harder thus for GBLS -- when they successfully
defend tenants against eviction without the use of a subsidy --
to stop the landlord from "ducking" (McCreight) in response. As
an alternative income-generating strategy, tenants may be able to
put the 'interdependencies' within their relationship to even
greater use. As an example, the tenant could convince the
landlord to be willing to use the tenant's inkind services --
maintaining the property, washing his car, doing the landlord's
shopping, babysitting etc. -- in lieu of some of the rent. The
HSP worker may be more able to help landlords and tenants to
choose this arrangement through the skills they employ of
surfacing underlying issues, feelings and beliefs. If the HSP
worker is skillful enough as a counselor with the landlord --
listening, validating, helping him to sort through thoughts and
feelings etc. -- what may surface is a strong remaining desire on
the landlord's part to preserve joint tenure. When the landlord
realizes this, he will increase his open-ness to discovering or
inventing the means by which he may continue to extend himself to
the tenant and remain stable.
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SERIES #4. A RECOMMENDATION FOR IMPROVING COORDINATION BETWEEN
LOCAL LEVEL OFFICES (HSP AND GBLS) AND STATE LEVEL ON THE
ADMINISTRATION OF DISTRIBUTION OF 707 RENTAL ASSISTANCE CERTI-
FICATES
A suggestion for a process of distributing the 'prevention'
certificates (for "at-risk" tenants)
The state is also planning to shift more of the existing
vouchers into the 'prevention' category -- to be issued to
"at-risk" tenants (at risk of being evicted unless they resolve
financial and other issues) rather than to the "homeless." The
state must first resolve the issue of what type of eligibility
system to establish. As an example, should the state give these
prevention certificates to those 'more well-off' "at-risk"
families who they know will be most likely to stay housed if they
receive it? -- a result of which would be to 'cut off' those who
are least likely to make it. Or, should the state give them to
those 'least well-off' "at-risk" families who are most likely to
end up being evicted unless they get the subsidy? -- a result of
which would be to prevent the 'more well-off' tenants from moving
away from being "at-risk."
To allocate these 'prevention' certificates among those
"at-risk" thus is a more complicated process than to allocate
them to the "homeless." Although the "homeless" qualifiers still
face a limited number of subsidies, the 'status' of their need is
40
more clear according to the state's criteria for allocation.
40. This is one reason why the system was established in this
fashion. The state first decided that entering into the "home-
less" category increased your priority status in relation to the
"at-risk" categories. Although placing the vouchers in the
"homelessness" category might 'induce tenants to become homeless'
in order to obtain one, (or create the conditions in which to
qualify without having to leave the unit), it did enable the
state to have a more 'clear' reason or standard in-which to
qualify someone for eligibility.
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As an effect of this complication, HSP regional offices (who
are among a number of agencies that have power on the local level
to secure vouchers for their clients) will face a new set of
issues about how to decide the number of these certificate which
each office will be allocated. The state's criteria will be less
'clear' as to who should get the "at-risk" vouchers than when the
client is "homeless." These offices will then become more
compelled to advocate at the state level in order to convince
them that their "at-risk" tenants are of a higher priority status
-- than those from another's office -- in order to 'win' the most
certificates for their office.
These offices will also become more competitive within
themselves in order to determine for whom among their "at-risk"
candidates they should advocate. To improve this system of
allocation, I am suggesting, the regional HSP offices should
adapt the following negotiation model.
The regional office representatives should meet together
with the state Rental Assistance program admininistration on a
monthly basis to work more collaboratively to apportion the
vouchers across the different programs. Each office would bring
their lists of eligible recipients to this meeting. As a group,
they may decide on a criteria system for apportioning across the
offices that will weigh in factors such as what the relative
severities are of the homlessness problem in each region. By
opening up this and other issues across which the parties could
trade -- shifting staff across the regions when specific short
term needs arise, exchanging information, letting landlords or
tenants who need immediate assistance to cross-register for
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another office's workshops, etc. This may serve to reduce the
positional bargaining that could likely take place and replace it
with a negotiation process where the joint gains are greater, and
the cooperation across offices increase.
SERIES #5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Further research should be done in the following areas:
A. Disputing patterns among landlords and tenants who
practice self-help to resolve disputes. (who are not using
professional services).
B. How many disputes are falling into each category along
the continuum of dispute resolution methods? How many
landlords and tenants use each category?
C. How to improve current dispute resolution methods
- When it's most appropriate to use which one.
- How to coordinate their use with state-level acti-
vities.
- In particular with HSP, how to increase it's moni-
toring activities.
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF INTEVIEWEES BY CATEGORY;
LANDLORDS; I INTERVIEWED 14 LANDLORDS
TENANTS; I INTERVIEWED 10 TENANTS
PROFESSIONALS;
Housing Services Program;
1. Josh Jacks: Mediator for Tri-CAP
2. Helena Chaikins: Client Services Advocate for Tri-CAP
3. Carol Burner: Landlord counselor and coordinator for Tri-CAP
4. Sarah Parker: Former Landlord counselor and coordinator (CAP)
5. Grace McKinnon: HSP coordinator: Chelsea HSP
6. Sandra Hawes: Statewide coordinator for HSP
7. Ann Hurley: Tenant Counselor for Quincy CAP
8. Nancy Callanan: Director of HSP for Quincy CAP
9. Rosemary Wahlberg: Executive Director for Quincy CAP
Greater Boston Legal Services
1. Dick Bauer: Staff Attorney: Quincy GBLS
2. Wyn Gerhard: Staff Attorney: Greater Boston Elder Services
3. Jay Rose: Staff attorney: GBLS
4. Linda Garcia: Paralegal: GBLS
5. Shorter conversations with a range of others
City Officials
1. Rose : Secretary for Building Inspection Dept.: City of
Quincy
2. Joe Prondak: Building Inspector: City of Quincy
3. Jane Reikard: Coordinator of Rent Grievance Board: City of
Quincy
4. Jack Hall: Manager within the Rent Equity Board: City of
Boston
5. Becky Stevens: Assistant Director of Housing; BRA (Boston
Redevelopment Authority)
State Officials
1. Judy Reilly: Assistant Deputy Commissioner: DSS
2. Carol Johnson: Director of Homelessness Services: DMH
3. Irene Lee: Homelessness Coordinator for EOHS (Executive
Office of Human Services)
4. Rufus Phillips: Research Director for MHFA (Massachusetts
Housing Finance Agency)
5. Jeanne Gould: Homeless Stabilization Worker for Department of
Public Welfare.
Non-Profit Advocates
1. Michael Fogelsberg: Associate Director: Massachusetts Tenants
Organization
2. Lew Finfer: Director of MAHA: Massachusetts Affordable
Housing Alliance
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Trade Associations
1. Ed Shanahan: Managing Director for the Rental Housing Associ-
ation for the Greater Boston Real Estate Board
Private Consultants
1. Rolf Goetz: Consultant to BRA
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